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Essays In Consumer Choice Dynamics And Their Implications On The Design Of 
Firm Strategies 
Abstract 
This dissertation is composed of two essays, each covering an important topic related to consumer 
choice dynamics and their implications on the design of firm strategies: (1) consumer learning and their 
implications on the use and design of introductory coupons that apply to the first-time purchases of a 
new product to enhance its profits; (2) distinguishing between different sources of consumer choice 
dynamics in a non-tiered loyalty program and its implications on the design of a more profitable program. 
In Chapter 1, I propose that in the retailing business, when consumer behavior exhibits individually 
heterogeneous choice dynamics, coupons are a useful tool to implement intertemporal price 
discrimination and targeted pricing. I document a one-time own-product passive learning process in 
consumers' purchasing behavior in the Boston Greek Yogurt market, where four new products entered the 
market in the Summer of 2012. Using a sample of 428 consumers who purchased at least one Greek 
Yogurt product during 2012 and 2013, I develop and estimate a structural model of consumer demand for 
Greek Yogurt products that captures three primary features that are specific to consumers' purchasing 
behavior in this market: (1) a one-time own-product passive learning process, (2) the purchase of 
varieties, and (3) the purchase of quantities. By estimating the model, I quantify the individual 
heterogeneity in (1) the price sensitivity, (2) the demand changes driven by consumer learning, and (3) the 
timeline of learning about different products. The documented learning process and the individual 
heterogeneity in the above dimensions in this multi-new-product marketing environment motivate (1) the 
use of a one-time coupon that is applicable for the first-time purchase of a new product to enhance its 
profits by leveraging the learning-driven changes in consumer demand, (2) the use of a coupon expiration 
date to filter out any "late", unprofitable coupon redemption, and (3) coupon customization to target 
different consumer with different designs. 
Using the estimated model, I compute the optimal coupon design for Chobani Flip to maximize its Net 
Present Value (NPV, the discounted profits summed over an infinite horizon since the product enters the 
market). The results show that the optimal targeted one-time expirable coupons can enhance the 
product's NPV by 55%. The NPV gain comes from three sources: (1) approximately 1/2 of this NPV gain 
comes from using the coupons to generate the intertemporal price discrimination that leverages the 
learning process; (2) approximately 1/3 of this NPV gain comes from targeted pricing that is achieved 
through coupon customization; and (3) the remaining 1/6 of this NPV gain comes from adding the 
targeted expiration dates to the coupons for filtering out any "late'', unprofitable coupon redemption. 
In Chapter 2, I distinguish between two different types of incentives that motivate consumers to spend 
more actively with a credit card in a non-tiered credit card loyalty program. By separately measuring them, 
I explore how to leverage the two types of incentives to re-design the current program to enhance the 
profit for the credit card company. 
I propose a framework that defines and incorporates two mechanisms through which a non-tiered loyalty 
program incentivizes cardholders to increase their credit card spending: (1) an economic mechanism, 
where forward-looking consumers 
with rational expectation are motivated by the option value of earning vouchers that derives from their 
potential redemption of vouchers in the future; and (2) a psychological mechanism, where consumers 
pursue the extrinsic reward thresholds established by the program as goals and are motivated by the 
satisfaction upon goal achievement, regardless of their actual voucher redemption behavior. Using a 
sample of 621 consumers between 2010 and 2012, with real-time records on their (1) credit card 
transactions, (2) activity of earning loyalty points, (3) activity of earning vouchers, and (4) activity of 
voucher redemption, I develop and estimate a structural model of consumer decisions on credit card 
spending and voucher redemption that is based on the above framework. 
Using the estimated model and through counterfactual experiments, I find that (1) the rewards generated 
by the current loyalty program, while resulting in a minimal price discount (up to 1%), effectively increase 
the sample population's credit card spending by 6%; and (2) approximately 89% of this increase is driven 
by the psychological mechanism. Given the relatively effective psychological mechanism and the 
relatively ineffective economic mechanism, I show through another set of counterfactual experiments 
that (1) increasing the points issuance ratios (points issued per dollar spent), a policy change that 
leverages both the economic and psychological mechanisms, will result in a profit increase for the credit 
card company but a welfare decrease for cardholders; (2) increasing the voucher face value, a policy 
change that only leverages the economic mechanism, will result in a profit decrease for the credit card 
company but a welfare increase for cardholders; and (3) to achieve a win-win outcome where profits and 
consumer welfare would both increase, it is necessary to increase both the points issuance ratios and the 
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN CONSUMER CHOICE DYNAMICS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON THE
DESIGN OF FIRM STRATEGIES
Minshen Li
Aviv Nevo
This dissertation is composed of two essays, each covering an important topic related to consumer
choice dynamics and their implications on the design of firm strategies: (1) consumer learning
and their implications on the use and design of introductory coupons that apply to the first-time
purchases of a new product to enhance its profits; (2) distinguishing between different sources of
consumer choice dynamics in a non-tiered loyalty program and its implications on the design of a
more profitable program.
In Chapter 1, I propose that – in the retailing business, when consumer behavior exhibits indi-
vidually heterogeneous choice dynamics, coupons are a useful tool to implement intertemporal price
discrimination and targeted pricing. I document a one-time own-product passive learning process
in consumers’ purchasing behavior in the Boston Greek Yogurt market, where four new products
entered the market in the Summer of 2012. Using a sample of 428 consumers who purchased at
least one Greek Yogurt product during 2012 and 2013, I develop and estimate a structural model
of consumer demand for Greek Yogurt products that captures three primary features that are spe-
cific to consumers’ purchasing behavior in this market: (1) a one-time own-product passive learning
process, (2) the purchase of varieties, and (3) the purchase of quantities. By estimating the model,
iv
I quantify the individual heterogeneity in (1) the price sensitivity, (2) the demand changes driven
by consumer learning, and (3) the timeline of learning about different products. The documented
learning process and the individual heterogeneity in the above dimensions in this multi-new-product
marketing environment motivate (1) the use of a one-time coupon that is applicable for the first-time
purchase of a new product to enhance its profits by leveraging the learning-driven changes in con-
sumer demand, (2) the use of a coupon expiration date to filter out any “late”, unprofitable coupon
redemption, and (3) coupon customization to target different consumer with different designs.
Using the estimated model, I compute the optimal coupon design for Chobani Flip to maximize its
Net Present Value (NPV, the discounted profits summed over an infinite horizon since the product
enters the market). The results show that the optimal targeted one-time expirable coupons can
enhance the product’s NPV by 55%. The NPV gain comes from three sources: (1) approximately 1/2
of this NPV gain comes from using the coupons to generate the intertemporal price discrimination
that leverages the learning process; (2) approximately 1/3 of this NPV gain comes from targeted
pricing that is achieved through coupon customization; and (3) the remaining 1/6 of this NPV
gain comes from adding the targeted expiration dates to the coupons for filtering out any “late”,
unprofitable coupon redemption.
In Chapter 2, I distinguish between two different types of incentives that motivate consumers to
spend more actively with a credit card in a non-tiered credit card loyalty program. By separately
measuring them, I explore how to leverage the two types of incentives to re-design the current
program to enhance the profit for the credit card company.
I propose a framework that defines and incorporates two mechanisms through which a non-tiered
loyalty program incentivizes cardholders to increase their credit card spending: (1) an economic
mechanism, where forward-looking consumers with rational expectation are motivated by the option
value of earning vouchers that derives from their potential redemption of vouchers in the future; and
(2) a psychological mechanism, where consumers pursue the extrinsic reward thresholds established
by the program as goals and are motivated by the satisfaction upon goal achievement, regardless of
v
their actual voucher redemption behavior. Using a sample of 621 consumers between 2010 and 2012,
with real-time records on their (1) credit card transactions, (2) activity of earning loyalty points,
(3) activity of earning vouchers, and (4) activity of voucher redemption, I develop and estimate
a structural model of consumer decisions on credit card spending and voucher redemption that is
based on the above framework.
Using the estimated model and through counterfactual experiments, I find that (1) the rewards
generated by the current loyalty program, while resulting in a minimal price discount (up to 1%),
effectively increase the sample population’s credit card spending by 6%; and (2) approximately 89%
of this increase is driven by the psychological mechanism. Given the relatively effective psycholog-
ical mechanism and the relatively ineffective economic mechanism, I show through another set of
counterfactual experiments that (1) increasing the points issuance ratios (points issued per dollar
spent), a policy change that leverages both the economic and psychological mechanisms, will result
in a profit increase for the credit card company but a welfare decrease for cardholders; (2) increasing
the voucher face value, a policy change that only leverages the economic mechanism, will result
in a profit decrease for the credit card company but a welfare increase for cardholders; and (3) to
achieve a win-win outcome where profits and consumer welfare would both increase, it is necessary
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Chapter 1
Consumer Learning and Optimal
Coupon Design
1.1 Introduction
Past work has documented the presence of state dependence in consumers’ purchasing behavior.
For example, Ackerberg (2003), Erdem et al. (2008), and Osborne (2011) document that consumer
demand for a product changes as consumers update their beliefs about the product through buying
and consumption. Two reasons prevent bricks and mortar retail shops from leveraging these demand
changes to enhance profits. First, it is inconvenient and costly for stores to track each consumer’s
past buying experience. Second, they cannot charge different consumers with differentiated shelf
prices. Coupons help retailers overcome these obstacles. While it seems alluring to use coupons
to leverage the consumer learning processes, how to design coupons, and to what extent coupons
enhance profits with the presence of consumer learning depends on the specifics of the learning
processes and of the consumer demand. In this chapter, I document a consumer learning process in
the Greek Yogurt market. Given the documented learning process, I analyze the optimal design of a
one-time coupon that is applicable for consumers’ first-time purchase of a new product and evaluate
the coupon’s value in enhancing the profits of the product.
The empirical analyses use the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data at the Kilts Center for Marketing.
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I observe a sample of 428 consumers in the Boston Scantrack market who purchased at least one
Greek Yogurt product during 2012 and 2013. In the summer of 2012, four new products entered
the market. I document a one-time own-product passive learning process, where myopic consumers
update their preferences towards each new product through their first-time purchase of the product.
Specifically, I find that consumer demand for a new product generally increases after consumers
purchase the first unit of the product; in contrast, the increase in demand is negligible after they
purchase the subsequent units of the product or following the purchase of the other products.
The documented learning process motivates the use of a one-time coupon that is applicable for
the first-time purchase of a new product to enhance its profits by leveraging the learning-driven
demand increase. The optimal design of the coupon value (i.e., the discount) faces a trade-off
between (1) the cost of a one-time price discount; and (2) the benefit of advancing a consumer’s
first-time purchase of the product.1 The outcome of the trade-off is subject to the specifics of (1)
the learning-driven demand increase, and (2) the consumer’s price sensitivity. As the consumer’s
post-learning demand increases, the post-learning profit margin tends to increase, so the benefit of
advancing her first-time purchase tends to increase. As the consumer becomes more price-sensitive,
the post-learning profit margin tends to decrease, so the benefit of advancing her first-time purchase
tends to decrease. At the same time, as she responds to the one-time discount more dramatically, it
becomes less costly to advance her first-time purchase. Ex-ante, the outcome of the trade-off is not
clear, and the optimal coupon value is determined by the specifics of the consumer.
In this study, the market I analyze is a multi-new-product environment, where multiple new
products entered the market around the same time. The consumer demand for a product may
decrease as she learns about and adjusts upward her preference towards the other products. In
this situation, the consumer’s “late” redemption of the coupon for this product is accompanied by a
higher chance that she has learned about the other products, which lowers her post-learning demand
for this product, and lowers its post-learning profit margin. As a result, her “late” redemption of the
1This would advance the arrival of the post-learning profit margin; it is desirable because a firm would typically
discount its future profits, so it values a sooner profit more than a later profit.
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coupon could be less profitable than her not redeeming the coupon at all. This motivates the use of a
coupon expiration date to filter out any “late”, unprofitable coupon redemption. The optimal design
of the expiration date is subject to the trade-off between (1) the benefit of filtering out any “late”,
unprofitable coupon redemption, and (2) the cost of filtering out any “late” but indeed profitable
coupon redemption. The outcome of the trade-off depends on (1) the demand increase driven by
the consumer’s own-product learning, (2) the demand decrease caused by the consumer’s learning
about the other products, and (3) her timing of learning about the other products, which, ex-ante,
is also unclear and depends on the specifics of the consumer.
To empirically study the optimal coupon design with the presence of consumer learning, I develop
and estimate a model of consumer demand for the Greek Yogurt products that incorporates the one-
time own-product passive learning process. Similar to Kim et al. (2002), my model also incorporates
two features peculiar to this market: (1) the purchase of multiple products (purchase of varieties),
(2) the purchase of multiple units of a product (purchase of quantities), during a single purchase.
Instead of choosing a single unit of a single product, consumers choose a basket of products, which
consists of different (product, quantity) pairs. Consumers receive the total belief-based expected
utility from the (product, quantity) pairs in their basket, at the same time, incurring the disutility
from paying the total price. Under the one-time own-product learning, a consumer updates the
values of her utility from a product once she has purchased the product for the first time. The
model primitives are threefold: (1) the pre-learning utility value of each (product, quantity) pair, (2)
the post-learning utility value of each (product, quantity) pair, and (3) the price coefficient.
My identification strategy is the following: First, the price coefficient is identified by the variation
in consumers’ product and quantity choice as product prices and product availability vary. The pre-
learning utility values are identified by (1) the average time it takes before consumers purchase each
new product and (2) the quantities purchased of the new products during their first-time purchases,
after accounting for the variation in product prices and product availability. The post-learning utility
values are identified by their post-learning purchasing behavior, after accounting for the variation
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in product prices and product availability.
To account for individual heterogeneity, I estimate the model in the form of a latent class frame-
work. The estimates reveal three types of consumers, with latent-class probabilities respectively 1/6,
2/3, and 1/6. The three types of consumers commonly increase their demand for a product after
learning. However, they have very different learning-driven demand changes and price coefficients,
suggesting potentially different coupon designs for different consumers.
Using the model estimates, I compute the optimal coupon design for Chobani Flip. The goal is to
maximize Chobani Flip’s net present value (NPV), defined as the discounted profits summed over an
infinite horizon since the product enters the market. The results reveal that the NPV-maximizing tar-
geted one-time expirable coupons that are applicable for consumers’ first-time purchase of Chobani
Flip, under the assumption of a 100% coupon redemption rate, can enhance the product’s NPV by
55%. The NPV gain comes from three sources: (1) approximately 1/2 of this NPV gain comes from
the intertemporal price discrimination that leverages the documented learning process; (2) approxi-
mately 1/3 of this NPV gain comes from targeted pricing that is achieved by coupon customization,
as the optimal coupon designs vary starkly across different consumers (respectively generating 100%,
3%, and 30% off the regular shelf price for different consumers); and (3) the remaining 1/6 of this
NPV gain comes from adding the targeted expiration dates to the coupons, leading to the lengths
of the validity windows respectively 14 weeks, 12 weeks, and 13 weeks for different consumers.
The contributions of this study are the following:
First, the literature on coupons has focused on its role in customer retention (Nevo et al. 2002 and
Lin et al. 2015). The study in this chapter supplements the past literature by (1) analyzing the role
of coupons in generating intertemporal price discrimination and targeted pricing in a market with
individually heterogeneous consumer choice dynamics, such as consumer learning, (2) computing the
optimal coupon design in this market through a structural modeling approach, and (3) quantifying
the effect of the optimal coupon design on a new product’s NPV.
Second, past work has extensively studied consumer choice dynamics, such as category con-
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sideration (Ching and Keane 2009), consumer learning (Erdem and Kean 1996, Ackerberg 2003,
Crawford and Shum 2005, Sunada 2019), inventory (Hendel and Nevo 2006), and switching costs
(Dubé, Hitsch and Allenby 2010, Osborne 2011, Nguyen 2014). This study supplements the past
work by documenting the presence of consumer learning in a different market.
Finally, this study supplements the past literature that studies different forms of promotion
strategies. One notable example is Sunada (2019), which studies the promotion strategies in the
digital goods industry that take the form of a limited duration of usage and free access to limited
features. This study explores a different form of promotions – the targeted one-time expirable
coupons applicable for the first-time purchase of a new product, which are among the popular
marketing devices adopted in the retailing business.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe the data for my empirical analyses
and provide suggestive evidence of (1) a one-time own-product passive learning process, (2) the
purchase of varieties, and (3) the purchase of quantities, in consumers’ purchasing behavior in the
Greek Yogurt market. In Section 1.3, I present a structural model of consumer demand for Greek
Yogurt products that incorporates the three features. In Section 1.4, I present a few details related
to model estimation. In Section 1.5, I present the estimation results and discuss the implications
of the results. In particular, I discuss how the model estimates motivate the use of the targeted
one-time expirable coupons applicable for the first-time purchase of a new product to enhance its
NPV. In Section 1.6, I compute the NPV-maximizing coupon design for Chobani Flip, quantify the
NPV gain from the optimal design, and discuss the practical implementation of the targeted coupon




In this study, I use the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data for my empirical analyses.2 I analyze the
product category “Greek Yogurt” as an example.3 In the Boston Scantrack market,4 I observe a
sample of 428 consumers who purchased at least one Greek Yogurt product over 87 weeks, from
January 1st, 2012 to July 31st, 2013.5 For each consumer, during each week, I observe (1) the price,
(2) the availability, and (3) the quantity purchased of each product. Appendix 1.8.1 provides details
on how I operationalize the variables (1) to (3) for my empirical analyses.
Table 1.1: Product Descriptions
Items/Unit Size (Oz) Entry Week Market Share (%)
Legacy Products
Chobani 1 6.0 63
Dannon Nonfat 1 6.0 5
Dannon Oikos 1 5.3 8
Fage 1 5.3 5
New Products
Chobani Flip 1 5.3 33 1
Dannon Light & Fit 4 6.0 29 7
Muller Quaker Greek Corner 1 5.3 29 2
Yoplait 1 5.3 31 10
Note: (1) Week 1 is defined as the week of January 1st, 2012 to January 7th, 2012; Week 2 is defined as the
week of January 8th, 2012 to January 14th, 2012, and so on. (2) Entry Week: The week when the product
entered the market. Legacy products are the products that entered the market before 2012. (3) Market
Share: The proportion of the total sales that are generated by the product during the 87 weeks.
2The Nielsen Datasets at the Kilts Center for Marketing is a relationship between the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business and the Nielsen Company: https://www.chicagobooth.edu/research/kilts/datasets/nielsen.
The Consumer Panel Data have a representative panel of households that continually provide information about their
purchases in a longitudinal study in which panelists stay on as long as they continue to meet Nielsen’s criteria. The
consumer panelists use in-home scanners to record all of their purchases (from any outlet) intended for personal,
in-home use. Consumers provide information about their households and what products they buy, as well as when
and where they make the purchases.
3The Greek Yogurt is a small product category. The small number of products the Greek Yogurt category has
facilitates this empirical analysis. Unlike regular yogurts, Greek Yogurts have higher protein, less sugar, dryer texture,
and stronger flavors. Besides treating them as snacks (like regular yogurts), people also consume Greek Yogurts for
(1) workout supplements and (2) cooking. Several brands in this study, Chobani, Fage, and Muller Quaker Greek
Corner, manufacture exclusively Greek Yogurt products. Therefore, I treat the Greek Yogurt and regular yogurts as
two separate product categories and focus only on Greek Yogurt products.
4Nielsen defines Scantrack markets as geographical areas where the company collects the data. Compared with
other Scantrack markets (such as New York) with similar metropolitan market characteristics and Greek Yogurt sales
volumes, the Boston market has a more concentrated market with only eight products generating 87% of the Greek
Yogurt sales in the market, which helps facilitate my empirical analyses in this study.
5I focus on the period before August, 2013 because from August 28th, 2013 to August 31st, 2013, Chobani expe-
rienced one of the most significant food product recalls. For studies on how product recalls impact product sales,
I refer interested readers to Zhao (2014) for a literature review. To avoid confounded dynamics coming from this
product-harm crisis, I focus my study on the period that ends four weeks ahead of the recall incident.
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This study focuses on eight products that have at least 1% market share in the sample.6 The
eight products in total account for 87% of the total sales in the sample. Table 1.1 describes the unit
size, the item size, and the market share of each product. Chobani dominates the market with a
63% market share. The other seven products have market shares ranging from 1% to 10%. Chobani,
Dannon Nonfat, Dannon Oikos, and Fage entered the market before 2012 (Legacy Products). Chobani
Flip, Dannon Light & Fit, Muller Quaker Greek Corner, Yoplait entered the market in the summer
of 2012 (New Products). New products such as Yoplait and Dannon Light & Fit penetrated the
market quickly as they ranked second and fourth in total sales within 60 weeks of entry.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics Related to Consumer Purchases
Obs Min 25th Median 75th Max Mean Std. Dev.
Number of Purchases 428 2 5 10 18 82 14 13
Interpurchase Time 428 1 4 7 13 73 11 12
Number of Products Purchased 428 1 2 2 4 8 3 1.5
Fraction of Purchases
of Varieties (%) 192 2 9 15 26 95 20 15
of Quantities (%) 415 13 75 92 100 100 85 18
Note: (1) Obs: The number of consumers. (2) Number of Purchases: The number of weeks when the
consumer purchased any of the eight Greek Yogurt products. (3) Interpurchase Time: The average
number of weeks between two consecutive purchases. (4) Number of Products Purchased: The number
of different products the consumer purchased during the 87 weeks. (5) Fraction of Purchases of Varieties
(%): The fraction of the consumer’s purchases where she purchased multiple products. (6) Fraction of
Purchases of Quantities (%): The fraction of the consumer’s purchases where she purchased multiple
units of a product.
Table 1.2 shows that on average, 14 out of the 87 weeks (16%) involve purchases of any of the
eight Greek Yogurt products. The average interpurchase time is 11 weeks. During the 87 weeks,
consumers purchased an average of three different products. Out of the 428 consumers, 192 (43%)
purchased multiple products during a single purchase (purchase of varieties).7 For these consumers,
on average, 20% of their purchases are purchases of varieties. Out of the 428 consumers, 415 (97%)
purchased multiple units of a product during a single purchase (purchase of quantities). For these
consumers, on average, 85% of their purchases are purchases of quantities.8
6Here, I define the market share of a product as the proportion of the total sales that are generated by this product
during the 87 weeks.
7As I work with the weekly-level data, here, a purchase is equivalent to a week during which the consumer purchased
any of the eight Greek Yogurt products.
8The statistics I obtain by pooling the observations are not reported in the table but are worth noting: (1) 648 out
of 6,081 (11%) purchases are purchases of varieties. Conditional on purchasing, the number of products purchased
is on average 1.1; (2) 5,336 out of 6,081 (88%) purchases are purchases of quantities. Conditional on purchasing, the
7
Table 1.3: Product Prices
Product Name Obs Min 25th Median 75th Max Mean Std. Dev.
Chobani 37,224 0.25 1.07 1.19 1.29 1.49 1.11 0.12
Dannon Nonfat 34,806 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.69 1.04 0.12
Dannon Oikos 34,825 0.11 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.69 1.04 0.12
Fage 36,050 0.19 1.10 1.19 1.33 1.99 1.27 0.26
Chobani Flip 16,520 0.33 1.19 1.30 1.39 1.86 1.31 0.19
Dannon Light & Fit 23,595 1.00 3.50 3.69 3.76 5.05 3.64 0.25
Muller Quaker Greek Corner 22,127 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.53 1.04 0.15
Yoplait 21,113 0.01 1.00 1.01 1.08 2.63 1.08 0.14
Note: (1) Obs: the number of weekly observations where the product was available. (2) The prices presented
are the weekly sales-weighted average prices. (3) The price used in my analyses is the net price, which is the
raw shelf price minus the price discount.
Table 1.3 provides an overview of the prices of the products. The price used for this analysis is
equal to the raw price minus the discount. There is no way to know the specific form of the discount,
but given that the minimum net price is close to zero, some of the discounts may come from “buy
one and get one free” deals or retailer coupons that have large values. Product prices vary from
$1.04/Unit to $1.31/Unit. For Dannon Light & Fit (which is in the form of a four-item unit), its
average price is $3.64/Unit (equivalently $0.91/item).
Panel A of Figure 1.1 shows that it took consumers an average of 24 to 30 weeks to initiate the
first purchase of a new product; however, after this purchase, the time to their second-time purchase
is shorter by an average of 1/4 to 1/3. Panel B of Figure 1.1 shows that during the second time
they purchased the product, the quantity purchased is 10% to 30% higher than that during the first
time. These two facts show that consumers increased their purchases of a new product after their
first-time purchase of the product, which seems to be consistent with a learning process.
1.2.2 Suggestive Evidence of a One-Time Own-Product Passive Learning
Process
To delve into what the learning process looks like, I examine how a consumer’s past experience of
purchasing different products affects her purchasing tendency towards the new products, controlling
for the variation in product prices and product availability. I estimate the following Random-Effects
quantity purchased of a product is on average 4.6 units.
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of the Interpurchase Time and Purchased Quantities
Note: (1) Panel A shows the average time intervals (a) between “no purchase yet” and
consumers’ first-time purchase and (b) between their first-time purchase and their
second-time purchase, of each product. (2) Panel B shows the average quantity purchased (a)
during consumers’ first-time purchase and (b) during their second-time purchase, of each
product. (3) Product A to D are the new products: Chobani Flip, Dannon Light & Fit,




Y ∗ijt if Y ∗ijt ≥ 0
0 if Y ∗ijt < 0
for j = 1, 2, . . . , 8,
where








4Qit + λij + εijt
Here i is the individual index, j is the product index, and t is the week index. The variable Yijt
is consumer i’s weekly purchasing volume of product j during week t. The variable Y ∗ijt is the
latent value of Yijt, which I refer to as the purchasing tendency. The 8 × 1 vector Pit includes the
price of each product faced by consumer i during week t. The 8 × 1 vector Ait indicates whether
each product was available to consumer i during week t. The 8 × 1 vector Wit indicates whether
consumer i has purchased each product before week t. The 8× 1 vector Qit records the cumulative
quantity consumer i has purchased of each product before week t. The variable λij is the individual-
product-level random-effect. The variable εijt is the normally distributed error as assumed in Tobit
9Tobit Models suit well the setting where the dependent variable (1) is continuous or has many discrete values,
(2) is lower bounded at 0, and (3) has many zeros. In my case, the dependent variable is the individual-level weekly
purchasing volume of a product, which has many discrete values, is nonnegative, and has 84% of the values 0.
Therefore, I use the Tobit Model for this analysis. For similar examples, I refer interested readers to Wang et al.
(2016) where the authors use the Random-Effects Tobit Model to analyze consumers’ decisions on how many hotel
nights to purchase monthly.
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Models.10


















































































































Figure 1.2: Own and Cross Effects of Past Buying Experience on the Purchasing Tendency
Towards Each New Product
Note: (1) Own Effect: The change in the purchasing tendency towards the product as a
function of the cumulative quantity purchased of the product in the past, compared to the
benchmark scenario, where the consumer has not yet purchased any product. (2) Cross
Effect: The average change in the purchasing tendency towards the product as a function of
the cumulative quantity purchased of the other products in the past, compared to the
benchmark scenario, where the consumer has not yet purchased any product.
Figure 1.2 visualizes the regression results by showing the changes in the predicted purchasing
tendency towards a new product as a function of (1) the cumulative quantity purchased of the product
in the past (the Own Effect), and (2) the cumulative quantity purchased of the other products in the
past (the Cross Effect).11 The results show that (1) consumers increased their purchasing tendency
towards a new product after they purchased the first unit of the product; (2) in contrast, purchasing
the subsequent units of the product or purchasing the other products have a notably smaller effect,
compared to (1).12
Figure 1.3 shows that consumers did not exhibit a pattern of experimentation where they are
10Appendix 1.8.2 experiments with a specification that nests the specification in the main text by including the
weekly fixed effects to control for any unobserved marketing information (such as the advertising intensity and shelf
space). It shows that adding the weekly fixed effects to the model worsens the model fit, and 92% of the effects do not
deviate from zero at the 5% significance level. Therefore, unobserved marketing information plays a relatively minor
role in explaining consumers’ purchasing behavior and is excluded from my formal analyses.
11For a given product, the cross effect is calculated as the average of the effects from the other seven products.
12Appendix 1.8.3 conducts an additional analysis where (1) I analyze consumers’ binary decisions on whether to
purchase a product by running the Fixed-Effects Logistic regressions that have the same covariates as the Tobit model
used in the main text; and (2) I analyze consumers’ weekly purchasing volume of a product conditional on purchasing
the product by running the Fixed-Effects OLS regressions that have the same covariates as the Tobit model used in
the main text. Similar to what I show in the main text, the findings are twofold: (1) consumers tend to purchase a
new product more frequently, and tend to increase the quantity purchased of the product conditional on purchasing
the product after purchasing the first unit of the product; (2) purchasing the subsequent units of the product or
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Figure 1.3: Evolution of the Distribution of the Number of Products Purchased
Note: First Six Months: The first six months since the four new products have all entered the
market (Week 33 to Week 60). Consumers on average purchased 1.67 products from Week 33
to Week 60. Last Six Months: The last six months before the sample ends (Week 60 to Week
87 ). Consumers on average purchased 1.80 products from Week 60 to Week 87.
supposed to initially widely switch among a broad set of products and later focus on a smaller
set of products, as documented in Crawford et al. (2008) and Sunada (2019). The pattern of
experimentation arises when consumers are forward-looking. Therefore, in my case, consumers
appear to be myopic. I refer to the learning process of a myopic consumer as a passive learning
process.
To summarize, the above evidence suggests that consumers’ purchasing behavior in the Greek
Yogurt market (1) follows a process that can be reasonably approximated by a one-time own-
product passive learning process, and exhibits (2) the purchase of varieties, and (3) the purchase
of quantities. In the next section, I write down a structural model of demand for Greek Yogurt
products that incorporates the three elements.
1.3 Model
In the previous section, I find that consumers’ purchasing behavior in the Greek Yogurt market (1)
follows a process that can be best approximated by a one-time own-product passive learning process,
and exhibits (2) the purchase of varieties, and (3) the purchase of quantities. This section presents a
model that captures the three elements. The way I capture (1) is similar to the literature on passive
Bayesian learning (Coscelli et al. 2004), where myopic agents update their beliefs about products
11
through purchases by using the Bayes rule. The way I capture (2) and (3) is similar to Kim et al.
(2002), where consumers can choose multiple units of multiple products each time rather than a
single unit of a single product. In Section 1.3.1, I describe the model. In Section 1.3.2, I highlight
the model primitives of interest.
1.3.1 Conceptual Framework
Let the 1 × J vector qit = (qi1t, qi2t, . . . , qiJt) denote the basket of products consumer i chooses in
period t. In this basket, the consumer chooses qijt units of product j. The consumer receives the
total utility from choosing the basket of products and receives the disutility from paying the total









where f(·|µ̃ijt) is the utility of choosing a certain quantity of product j,13 and
∑J
j=1 pijtqijt is the
total price. The random variable µ̃ijt is consumer i’s belief about her taste for product j in period
t, which is given by
µ̃ijt ∼ N(µ̄ijt, σ2ijt)
where µ̄ijt and σ2ijt are the mean and variance of her belief.
In a one-time learning process, consumers receive a perfect signal about their taste for the product
from their first-time purchase. The signal is not noisy: it has zero variance and is equal to the
consumer’s true taste for the product, denoted by µij .14 By Bayes rule, the evolution of µ̄ijt and
13Similar to Kim et al. (2002), I assume that the total utility from a basket is the linear aggregation of the utility
values of the products in the basket. The model abstracts away from a negative spillover effect among the products
because, in the quantity choice setting, this effect cannot possibly be identified: a consumer buying 1 unit of Product
A and 1 unit of Product B rather than two units of Product A or two units of Product B can be caused by the
diminishing marginal utility from purchasing a higher quantity of a single product. The model abstracts away from a
positive spillover effect among the products because I find that there is little spillover learning in the previous section.
14In a general Bayesian learning framework, the signal comes from a distribution that has a mean equal to the true
taste for the product and a nonzero variance. The noises in the signals are the reasons why consumers’ updated beliefs
may still have uncertainty and may not have a mean equal to the true taste even after a certain number of purchases
in those studies.
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σ2ijt is given by
µ̄ijt = (1−Dijt)µij0 +Dijtµij
σ2ijt = (1−Dijt)σ2ij0
where µij0 and σ2ij0 are the mean and variance of consumer i’s prior belief about product j, which is
the belief the consumer has before she ever tries the product, and variable Dijt is a binary variable
indicating whether the consumer has ever purchased product j before period t.
Consumer i chooses the basket of products, the 1 × J vector, qit, to maximize her belief-based
expected net utility in each period, given by













where the consumer calculates the expectation using her belief µ̃ijt ∼ N(µ̄ijt, σ2ijt).
1.3.2 Parametric Form and Model Primitives
Given the one-time own-product learning process, a consumer only has two states for each product:
Learned and Not Learned. Therefore, her belief-based expected utility of choosing q units of product









When the consumer updates her belief about product j from µ̃ij ∼ N(µij0, σ2ij0) into µ̃ij ∼ N(µij , 0)
after her first-time purchase of the product, her utility values change from θ0ijq to θ1ijq for every q.
Let J denote the number of products available and let K denote the largest quantity one would
consider purchasing of each product. Without imposing a functional form for f , I intend to estimate
the values of θ0ijq and θ1ijq for all j = 1, . . . , J and q = 1, . . . ,K, i.e., the utility values of every
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(product, quantity) pair.15 Let θijqt ≡ E
[
f(q|µ̃ijt)
∣∣∣µijt, σ2ijt], which can be expressed as
θijqt = (1−Dijt)θ0ijq +Dijtθ1ijq













where θijkt is given by
θijkt = (1−Dijt)θ0ijk +Dijtθ1ijk
1.4 Estimation
The previous section presents a model of consumer demand that incorporates a one-time own-
product passive learning process. The primitives of the model are threefold: (1) the pre-learning
utility values, θ0ijq for each j and q; (2) the post-learning utility values, θ1ijq for each j and q; and
(3) the price coefficient, αi. To estimate the model parameters, in Section 1.4.1, I cast the model
into a discrete choice framework, where each discrete choice represents the choice of a specific basket
of products that consists of certain (product, quantity) pairs. Section 1.4.2 approximates the raw
data to limit the size of the choice set for computational feasibility. I also show the accuracy of
this approximation method in capturing the raw data. Given the approximation method, the choice
set has 481 choices. Section 1.4.3 constructs the likelihood function and presents the estimation
method. Section 1.4.4 discusses model identification and verifies the empirical identifiability of the
model.
15Alternatively, one can model the learning process only for the new products, so θ0ijq = θ1ijq for the legacy products
(j = 1, 2, 3, 4). This way of modeling implicitly enforces the assumption that every consumer has already learned
about each of the legacy products, which may be invalid, as some consumers may have never tried legacy products
before. Most ideally, one would like to track every consumer’s shopping history to verify whether they have purchased
the legacy product, which is not feasible given the structure of Nielsen data. Nielsen drops consumers out of the panel
every year if they fail to meet the minimum reported spending requirement during that panel year and supplements
the panel with new consumers in the next year. In my sample, from 2011 to 2012, the attrition rate is 25%. From 2010
to 2011, the attrition rate is 33%. Therefore, for 46% of the consumers in my sample, we cannot decide whether they
ever purchased the legacy product within the past two years before the start of the sample (i.e., 2012). Therefore,
while I model the learning process for legacy products the same way as for new products as if every consumer had not
yet learned about any of the legacy products, the purpose, however, is only to fit the data better; and the estimates of
θ0ijq and θ1ijq for legacy products do not reflect the actual updates in consumers’ preferences towards these products.
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1.4.1 Econometric Specification
To estimate the model, I cast it into a discrete choice framework. Let d denote a discrete choice of a
basket of products, i.e., a 1× J vector q = (q1, q2, . . . , qJ), where qj refers to the quantity chosen of
product j. In choice d, let qdj denote the chosen quantity of product j. Let d = 0 denote the outside














+ εidt if d > 0
εi0t if d = 0
where the variable εidt is the utility shock associated with choice d, typically assumed as i.i.d. logit
errors in the discrete choice framework.16
1.4.2 Limiting the Size of the Choice Set for Structural Estimation
The choice set could have more than 108 choices if consumers can simultaneously choose up to eight
products and more than ten units of each product at each decision point. To reduce the size of the
choice set for computational feasibility, I limit the number of quantity choices and product choices
as follows:
(1) 99.2% of the weekly observations in the data involve a simultaneous choice of fewer than three
products, so I cap the number of products chosen during each week at 2. For the observations where
the consumer purchased more than two products, I keep the two products of which the consumer
purchased the highest quantities in that observation. If a tie still exists, I keep only the two products
on which the consumer spent the most in that observation.
(2) I approximate the observed chosen quantity that falls within each specified interval with a
specific quantity (referred to as the representative quantity) as follows: When the quantity is 1 to
3 (a small quantity), I approximate the quantity as the weighted average of the observed quantities
that are equal to 1 to 3, denoted by q̂j1 ≡ Ê[qjt|1 ≤ qjt ≤ 3]. Similarly, when the quantity is 4 to 6
16By estimating the utility values of every (product, quantity) pair, I have implicitly accounted for any unobserved
characteristics related to every product and every quantity. This makes any correlation structure to be assumed in
the utility shocks (1) empirically indistinguishable from the estimated utility values, and (2) not important.
15
(a medium quantity), I approximate the quantity as q̂j2 ≡ Ê[qjt|4 ≤ qjt ≤ 6]. When the quantity is
7 to 9 (a large quantity), I approximate the quantity as q̂j3 ≡ Ê[qjt|7 ≤ qjt ≤ 9]. When the quantity
is more than 9 (an extra-large quantity), I approximate the quantity as q̂j4 ≡ Ê[qjt|qjt ≥ 10]. For
Chobani, for example, the four representative quantities are respectively q̂11 = 2.07, q̂12 = 4.81,
q̂13 = 7.82, and q̂14 = 13.82.
Appendix 1.8.4 experiments with a three-interval, a four-interval (described above), and a six-
interval specifications and decides on the best specification in terms of their accuracy of capturing
the raw data and their computational feasibility. It shows that the four-interval specification is the
best specification as it (1) causes zero error in capturing the total product sales in the sample, (2)
causes only 11% error in capturing the individual-level product sales, which is 40% less than the
three-interval specification, and only 26% higher than the six-interval specification, and (3) has a
minimal effect on the variations used for this study, as shown by a close match between the Tobit
regression results using the raw data and using the approximated data. Let K̃ ≡ 4 denote the
number of available quantity choices given the approximation method. The resulting number of











1.4.3 Likelihood Function and Estimation Method
I account for individual heterogeneity using the latent class framework. Assume there are N types
of consumers. Let the vector
θn ≡ (θ0n11, . . . , θ0n1K̃ , . . . , θ
0




, θ1n11, . . . , θ
1
n1K̃





denote the parameters of Type n, which occurs at a probability πn such that
∑N
n=1 πn = 1.
Given the approximated data, let q̂dj denote the quantity of product j (which is also the repre-














if d > 0
0 if d = 0
16
denote the mean utility from choosing d. Conditional on being Type n, the probability of consumer
i choosing d in period t is













where the vector Xit consists of the observed information of consumer i during week t (product
prices, product availability, and the consumer’s past buying experience).














where variable dit is the observed basket choice of consumer i in period t. Θ includes all the
parameters to be estimated, D includes all the observed choices, and X includes all the observed
information. The variable T is the number of periods observed of each consumer.17
Let lin(θn|Di, Xi) denote the likelihood contribution by consumer i if she is Type n, and let
li(Θ|Di, Xi) denote the unconditional likelihood contribution by consumer i. The expressions for lin









The expressions of lin and li will be used in the next section to compute the individual-level posterior
type distributions.
I estimate the model using the method of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
1.4.4 Identification
Two sources of variation identify the price coefficient (αi): (1) the variation in the quantity choice
of a given product as the price of the product varies, and (2) the pattern of switching across dif-
ferent products as their relative prices vary. The pre-learning utility values, (θ0n11, . . . , θ0n1K̃ , . . . ,
17In my case, each consumer has 87 weekly observations, so T = 87.
17
θ0nJ1, . . . , θ
0
nJK̃
), are identified by (1) the average time it takes before consumers first-time purchased
the products, and (2) the quantities purchased of the products during their first-time purchases, af-
ter accounting for the variation in product prices and product availability. The post-learning utility
values, (θ1n11, . . . , θ1n1K̃ , . . . , θ
1
nJ1, . . . , θ
1
nJK̃
), are identified by the variation in their post-learning
product and quantity choice, after accounting for the variation in product prices and product avail-
ability. To confirm that the structural model is empirically identifiable, Appendix 1.8.5 conducts a
parameter recovery exercise. I simulate datasets from the estimated Two-Latent-Class model and
use the simulated datasets to re-estimate the model. Figure 1.18 shows that every parameter value
is covered by the 95% confidence interval of the 100 estimates generated from the 100 simulated
datasets,18 suggesting that the MLE method recovers the model parameters accurately.
1.5 Estimation Results
In this section, I present the estimation results and discuss the preliminary business insights from the
estimates. In Section 1.5.1, I use the in-sample model fit and the out-of-sample prediction accuracy
to decide that consumers can be best characterized into three types; In section 1.5.2, I verify the
model’s ability to fit the average purchasing behavior and the individual-level purchasing behavior.
In Section 1.5.3, I present the model estimates. In Section 1.5.4, I use the estimates to motivate
the use of targeted one-time expirable coupons to leverage the individually heterogeneous learning
processes to enhance the profits of a new product. In Section 1.5.5, I compute the individual-level
posterior distributions of types, which I will use as the true type information of each consumer in
my counterfactual analyses in the next section.
18In this study, when it comes to a 95% confidence interval that is computed from simulations, it refers [2.5th, 97.5th]
percentiles of the simulated results.
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1.5.1 The Optimal Number of Types
I select the optimal number of latent classes (types) based on two measures: (1) the in-sample fit and
(2) the out-of-sample predictive accuracy.19 Figure 1.4 summarizes (1) the in-sample fit measures:
the log-likelihood, AIC, BIC, and (2) the out-of-sample prediction accuracy: cross-validation errors,
given the different numbers of types the model incorporates. I calculate the log-likelihood, AIC, and
BIC from the full-sample model estimates. In calculating the cross-validation errors, I follow this
routine: I randomly divide the data into a training dataset that consists of 80% of the consumers,
and a test dataset that has the remaining 20%. Conditional on a training-test division v, I estimate
the model using the training dataset; then, using the estimates, I simulate consumers’ purchasing
decisions in the test dataset. Let yvij denote the observed aggregate purchasing volume of product
j by consumer i in the test dataset, and let ŷvijs denote the simulated aggregate purchasing volume
of product j by consumer i in the s-th simulation. The cross-validation error for product j in the








|ŷvijs − yvij |
where I ≡ 428 consumers and S ≡ 10, 000 simulations. The average cross-validation error for







Figure 1.4 shows that compared with the Two-Latent-Class model, the Three-Latent-Class model
has a higher Log-Likelihood, lower AIC, lower BIC, and lower cross-validation errors. Increasing
the number of classes from three to four generates a minor increase in the Log-Likelihood, a minor
decrease in AIC and BIC, but a considerable increase in the cross-validation errors. For robustness
checks, Appendix 1.8.6 calculates cross-validation errors under the 70%-30% training-test divisions
and 90%-10% divisions. It shows that the pattern of cross-validation errors is robust and is in favor
of the Three-Latent-Class model. Heuristically, the Three-Latent-Class model is the “elbow point”,
19The out-of-sample predictive accuracy assesses the model’s suitability for projection into larger-scale business use.
19
so the optimal number of latent classes is three.20
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Figure 1.4: Log-Likelihood, AIC, BIC, and Cross-Validation Errors
Note: (1) Product A to H : Chobani, Dannon Nonfat, Dannon Oikos, Fage, Chobani Flip,
Dannon Light & Fit, Muller Quaker Greek Corner, and Yoplait. Product I: The sum of the
purchasing volumes across the eight products. (2) Calculation Method: I calculate the
log-likelihood, AIC, and BIC from the full-sample model estimates. In calculating the
cross-validation errors, I estimate the models using the randomly-sampled 80% of the
consumers as the training dataset; then, I simulate data for the remaining 20% of the
consumers (the test dataset). For a given product, conditional on a training-test division, a
simulated test sample, and a consumer, the cross-validation error is the absolute deviation of
the simulated purchasing volume from the observed value. Then I average the errors across
the 428 consumers, the 10,000 simulated test samples (per training-test division), and the 10
random training-test divisions.
1.5.2 Model Fit
I analyze how the Three-Latent-Class model fits the consumer purchasing behavior in the absolute
sense. I analyze (1) how the model fits the average purchasing behavior and (2) how the model
fits the individual purchasing behavior. I simulate 10,000 samples using the estimated model. In
analysis (1), I compare the observed purchasing volume of each product with its 10,000 simulated
values. Panel A of Figure 1.5 shows that the observed value of each product is covered by the
95% confidence interval of its 10,000 simulated values. In analysis (2), for each product, I compute
the proportion of consumers whose observed purchasing volume is covered by the 95% confidence
interval of their 10,000 simulated values (the hit rate). Panel B of Figure 1.5 shows that the hit rates
20The elbow method is a heuristic method of interpretation and validation of consistency within-cluster analyses
designed to help find the appropriate number of clusters in a dataset. This method suggests that one should choose
the number of clusters so that adding another cluster does not give much better modeling of the data.
20
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Figure 1.5: Within-Sample Model Fit
Note: (1) Product A to H : Chobani, Dannon Nonfat, Dannon Oikos, Fage, Chobani Flip,
Dannon Light & Fit, Muller Quaker Greek Corner, and Yoplait. Product I: The sum of the
purchasing volumes across the eight products. (2) Panel A shows the observed purchasing
volume of each product and the 95% confidence intervals of its 10,000 simulated values. For
each product, the values presented are normalized by the observed value of that product. (3)
In Panel B, the hit rate is the proportion of consumers whose observed purchasing volumes
are covered by the 95% confidence interval of their 10,000 simulated values.
range from 0.52 to 0.80 across the products, the values of which are comparable to those reported
in the past studies, 0.40 to 0.65 in Sunada (2019), and 0.68 to 0.88 in Chapter 2.
1.5.3 Model Estimates
Figure 1.6 shows the estimated latent class probabilities (π̂1 = 0.15, π̂2 = 0.69, π̂3 = 0.15) and price
coefficients (α̂1 = −0.16, α̂2 = −0.78, α̂3 = −0.42). Figure 1.7 shows the estimated pre-learning
and post-learning utility values. For 3/4 of the (product, quantity) pairs, the utility values increase
after learning.
1.5.4 The Implications of Model Estimates
The implications of the model estimates are threefold:
A. The Own-Product Learning Creates A Heterogeneous Demand Increase. Figure 1.8
shows that consumer demand for a new product increases after learning.21 The increases in demand,
21For each product, I calculate the expected weekly purchasing volume of an average consumer from the estimated
model. In my calculation, without a loss of generality, I set the price of each product as the sales-weighted average







































Figure 1.6: Latent Class Probabilities and Price Coefficients
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PRE-LEARNING
POST-LEARNING
Figure 1.7: Pre-Learning and Post-Learning Utility Values
Note: (1) Product A to H : Chobani, Dannon Nonfat, Dannon Oikos, Fage, Chobani Flip,
Dannon Light & Fit, Muller Quaker Greek Corner, and Yoplait. (2) Quantity Choice: 1 =
Small, 2 = Medium, 3 = Large, 4 = Extra Large.
22















































































Figure 1.8: Evolution of Purchasing Activity
Note: The vertical axis is the expected weekly purchasing volume of an average consumer.
however, are heterogeneous across consumers. For example, the ranking of the demand increases for
Chobani Flip (Product E) is Type I > Type III > Type II.
B. The Heterogeneous Price Sensitivities Imply Heterogeneous Costliness of Advanc-
ing the First-Time Purchase and Post-Learning Profit Margins. Figure 1.9 visualizes the
heterogeneity in demand curves for Chobani Flip across consumers. Panel A shows the pre-learning
demand and Panel B shows the post-learning demand. Panel A shows that before learning, the
consumer’s sensitivity to price discounts is Type II > Type III > Type I.22 As the firm’s ability
to advance a consumer’s first-time purchase of a new product relies on the consumer’s sensitivity
to price discounts, the implied ranking of the the costliness of advancing the first-time purchase
through a price discount is Type II > Type I > Type III.23 Panel B shows that correspondingly, the
22For example, a 50% discount ($0.66/Unit) off the benchmark price ($1.31/Unit) can generate 0.25 units/week
increase in the purchasing volume from Type II. That same amount of purchase increase from Type I and Type III
would require a discount of $0.84/Unit and $1.20/Unit.
23The costliness of advancing the first-time purchase of a product refers to the amount of discount needed to advance
the consumer’s first-time purchase of the product by one week.
23




























































Figure 1.9: Evolution of the Curves of Demand for Chobani Flip
Note: (1) Panel A: The pre-learning demand as a function of price discounts. Panel B: The
post-learning demand as a function of price increases. (2) The benchmark price is the
sales-weighted average price of Chobani Flip in my data, $1.31/Unit.
ranking of the price insensitivity of the post-learning demand is Type I > Type III > Type II.24 As
the post-learning profit margin relies on the consumer’s post-learning price insensitivity, the implied
ranking of the post-learning profit margin is Type I > Type III > Type II.
C. Learning About the Other Products Creates a Heterogeneous Demand Decrease for
the Focal Product. Figure 1.10 shows that consumer demand for Chobani Flip decreases when
the consumer has learned about the other products. This reflects the competition effect present on
the market. As the other products lock in the consumer first, it becomes harder for this product to
profit. The ranking of the demand decrease is Type III > Type I > Type II.
To summarize, the increase in consumer demand after the own-product learning motivates the use of
a one-time coupon that is applicable for a consumer’s first-time purchase of a new product to enhance
its profits. The coupon creates a “low-high” pricing pattern for the consumer, thereby achieving
the intertemporal price discrimination that leverages the learning process. The heterogeneous (1)
learning-driven demand changes, and (2) price sensitivity motivate the targeted design of the coupon
value. Finally, the heterogeneous (1) demand increases driven by the own-product learning, (2)
demand decreases driven by the consumer’s learning about the other products, and (3) timing of the
24For example, when the price increases by $0.50/Unit from the benchmark ($1.32/Unit), Type II ’s purchasing
volume becomes close to 0, Type III ’s purchasing volume decreases by 1/2, and Type I ’s purchasing volume decreases
by only 1/3.
24
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Figure 1.10: The Effect of the Consumer Learning About Chobani Flip’s Competitors on the
Demand for Chobani Flip
Note: (1) Learned About No Competitor (Benchmark): The consumer has not yet purchased
the other new products. (2) Learned About One Competitor : The consumer has learned about
Dannon & Fit. (3) Learned About Two Competitors: The consumer has learned about Dannon
& Fit and Muller Quaker Greek Corner. (4) Learned About Three Competitors: The consumer
has learned about Dannon & Fit, Muller Quaker Greek Corner, and Yoplait. (5) The vertical
axis presents the normalized value, calculated by dividing the per-capita weekly purchasing
volume by the corresponding value in the case of Learned About No Competitor (Benchmark).
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consumer learning about the other products, motivate the use of targeted expiration dates to filter
out any “late”, unprofitable coupon redemption.25 The optimal design for each consumer is unclear
and remains an empirical question.
1.5.5 Individual Type Information
In the next section, I will compute the NPV-maximizing coupon design for Chobani Flip and quantify
its resulting effect on Chobani Flip’s NPV. I have estimated the sample-population-level latent class


































Figure 1.11: The Individual Posterior Probabilities of Being Each Type
Note: The graph shows the distribution of the individual posterior probabilities of being each
type. For each type, it presents the 95% confidence interval of the 428 individual posterior
probabilities. Here the 95% confidence interval is calculated as [µ̄− 1.96σ̂, µ̄+ 1.96σ̂], where µ̄
is the mean, and σ̂ is the standard error.
Figure 1.11 shows the distribution of π̄i1, π̄i2, and π̄i3 (i = 1, . . . , 428). Every consumer’s type
information is characterized by (π̄i1, π̄i2, π̄i3). If a firm knew this information, it could accomplish
perfect targeting (by maximizing the expected NPV based on (π̄i1, π̄i2, π̄i3) for each consumer).
Otherwise, the firm may maximize the expected NPV based on the sample-population-level type
25For a given product, the consumer demand for the product may decrease as the consumer adjusts upward her
preferences towards the other products. In this case, the “late” redemption of the coupon for this product is accompa-
nied by a higher chance that she has learned about the other products, which results in a lower post-learning demand
for this product and therefore a lower post-learning profit margin from it. In this situation, the consumer’s “late”
redemption of the coupon could be less profitable than her not redeeming the coupon at all.
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information, (π̂1, π̂2, π̂3). I also assign each consumer to Pseudo Type n if π̄in > π̄in′ for n′ 6= n.
Given this assignment rule, 16%, 68%, and 16% of consumers are Pseudo Type I, II, and III. In
the next section, I use the pseudo types for a clean, illustrative summary of the the optimal coupon
designs targeted at different consumers.
1.6 The Optimal Coupon Design
In this section, I use the model estimates to compute the NPV-maximizing coupon design for Chobani
Flip and quantify its resulting effect on Chobani Flip’s NPV. In Section 1.6.1, I present the opti-
mization problem. In Section 1.6.2, I describe a few details related to solving the problem. In
Section 1.6.3, I present the computation results. In Section 1.6.4, I discuss whether and how we can
implement the optimal targeted coupon designs in practice to enhance Chobani Flip’s NPV.
1.6.1 Conceptual Framework
Let j denote a new product that enters the market in Week T0. The firm that sells product j aims
to maximize the product’s NPV, using a discount factor δj . Let Πjt denote the profit of the product





Let pij denote product j’s shelf price faced by consumer i.26 Let cij denote the coupon value, and
Tij the expiration time.27 If the firm can tell the consumer’s type information, (π̄i1, π̄i2, π̄i3), by use
26The individualized shelf price combined with an individualized coupon is implementable because it is equivalent
to a uniform shelf price combined with sending out two individualized coupons to each consumer. The first coupon is
a one-time coupon that is applicable for the first-time purchase of a product. The second coupon is a loyalty program
card that always subtracts a certain amount off the shelf price. Therefore, the implementability of a strategy discussed
in this study is not about whether firms can physically implement the customized shelf prices, but about how firms
can tell each consumer’s individual type information to design the targeted coupons.
27Here, I assume that the manufacturer of the new product sends out the coupon upon its entry into the market,
i.e., in period T0. Therefore, the expiration time refers to the length of the validity window of the coupon since T0.
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of the coupon, it can target the consumer with the following pricing:28
pijt(Dijt|pij , cij , Tij) =

pij − cij if Dijt = 0 and t ≤ T0 + Tij
pij Otherwise
where Dijt is the binary variable indicating whether the consumer has purchased the product before












pijt(Dijt|pij , cij , Tij), pi(−j)t, Ai(−j)t
∣∣∣θn,mcjt)]
where I ≡ 428 is the number of consumers; N ≡ 3 is the number of types; π̄in is consumer i’s
posterior probability of being Type n; pi(−j)t is the 7×1 vector that consists of the prices of product
j’s competitors faced by consumer i in period t; Ai(−j)t is the 7 × 1 vector that indicates product
j’s competitors’ availability to consumer i in period t; θn are model primitives of Type n; and mcjt
is product j’s marginal cost of production in period t. The expression of the profit, Πijt, is given by
Πijt = qijt
(









To analyze the value of coupons in (1) generating the intertemporal price discrimination that lever-
ages the learning process; in (2) achieving the targeted pricing through coupon customization; and
in (3) filtering out any “late”, unprofitable coupon redemption by having a coupon expiration date,
I solve the problem in the following cases and compare their solutions and the resulting NPVs:
Case 1: No Coupons. cij = 0, Tij = ∞. The firm sets a uniform shelf price pi = p, based
on the sample-population-level type distribution, (π̂1, π̂2, π̂3), i.e., by setting π̄in = π̂n, for every
consumer i.
Case 2: Uniform Non-Expirable Coupons. pij = pj , cij = cj , Tij = ∞. The firm designs
a uniform strategy based on the sample-population-level type distribution, (π̂1, π̂2, π̂3).
28In this chapter, I assume that the coupon redemption rate is 100%. As a result, after receiving the coupon of a new
product, consumers would automatically redeem the coupon to get the price discount when they make the first-time
purchase of the product. This assumption could not hold in a setting where coupon redemption is not convenient.
For example, in Chapter 2, I study a case where the redemption rate of paper-version vouchers in a loyalty program
between 2010 and 2012 was only 39%. If we assume a 39% redemption rate, my speculation is that the NPV gain
that results from the NPV-maximizing coupon design should be approximately 39% of what I will later present, i.e.,
0.39×55% = 21%. However, to this day and age, the coupon redemption rate could approach 100% if the redemption
process could be made extremely smooth with the help of advanced technology.
28
Case 3: Targeted Non-Expirable Coupons. Tij = ∞. The firm sets pij and cij for every i,
based on the individual-level type information, (π̄i1, π̄i2, π̄i3).
Case 4: Uniform Expirable Coupons. pij = pj , cij = cj , Tij = Tj . The firm designs a
uniform strategy based on the sample-population-level type distribution, (π̂1, π̂2, π̂3).
Case 5: Targeted Expirable Coupons. The firm sets pij , cij , and Tij for every i, based on
the individual-level type information, (π̄i1, π̄i2, π̄i3).
Let Ss ≡ (p∗ijs, c∗ijs, T ∗ijs) denote the optimal strategy computed in Case s. The resulting NPV











pijt(Dijt|p∗ijs, c∗ijs, T ∗ijs), pi(−j)t, Ai(−j)t
∣∣∣θn,mcjt)]
where π̄in is the true type information each consumer i, i.e., the posterior probability of i being
Type n.
1.6.2 Solving the NPV-Maximization Problems
A. Assumptions. I assume away a few possible differences in the marketing information across con-
sumers when solving the optimization problem for a product: (1) The product’s competitors’ prices
are the same across consumers; (2) The product’s competitors’ prices are time-invariant. Specifically,
I set the price of each product to be its sales-weighted average price in my data. (3) The product’s
competitors are constantly available. Assumptions (1) and (2) assume away competitors’ strategic
responses, and Assumption (3) eliminates the need to model any process of product availability.
More importantly, the three assumptions serve to highlight the differences in the optimal coupon
designs for different consumers that are indeed caused by the differences in their model primitives
(the pre-learning utility values, the post-learning utility values, and the price coefficient). Appendix
1.8.7 presents evidence from the data that justifies the assumptions.
B. Marginal Cost and Discount Factor. I conduct a case study on Chobani Flip. I set its
29
marginal cost of production to be $1.02/Unit.29 I use a 5% annual discount rate, so the weekly dis-
count factor is δ = 0.999107. The industry typically uses annual discount rates that range from 5%
to 20%. The higher the discount rate, the more short-sighted the firm is. Appendix 1.8.8 presents
the case with an annual discount rate of 20%, which is equivalent to setting the weekly discount
factor δ = 0.99. It shows that the optimal coupon designs are similar between the two different
annual discount rates.
C. Numerical Method. I search from 0% to 200% of Chobani Flip’s observed average price, i.e.,
from $0/Unit to $2.60/Unit, for the shelf price and coupon value, with grid size $0.10. For the
expiration time, I search between 0 and Week 56, with grid size one week.30
D. Finite Horizon vs. Infinite Horizon. In the main text, I solve an infinite-horizon-NPV-
maximization problem. Appendix 1.8.9 solves a finite-horizon-NPV-maximization problem in “Case
3: Targeted Non-Expirable Coupons” as an example. It shows that under the 5% annual discount
rate, the finite-horizon solution and the resulting optimal NPV numerically converge to the infinite-
horizon counterpart when the length of the finite horizon expands beyond 25 weeks (6 months).
1.6.3 Results
Panel A of Figure 1.12 presents the results in Case 1 to 5. From “Case 1: No Coupons” to “Case
2: Uniform Non-Expirable Coupons”, the NPV increases from $50 to $64 (+27%), which represents
the value of the designed coupons in generating intertemporal price discrimination that leverages
the learning process. From “Case 2: Uniform Non-Expirable Coupons” to “Case 3: Targeted Non-
Expirable Coupons”, the targeted coupons further increase the NPV from $64 to $74 (+15%),
29IBIS World’s 2017 report on the yogurt industry shows that the total cost of firms’ purchases of raw materials for
yogurt production accounts for 68.70% of the industry’s total revenues. I assume that in 2012 and 2013, this ratio
is the same as in 2017. In 2012 and 2013, on average, the costs of labor account for 9.30% of the industry’s total
revenues. Therefore, I approximate that the total variable costs account for 78% of the industry’s total revenues.
Under the assumption of constant marginal costs, the marginal cost of producing Chobani Flip is thus 78% of its
per-unit price. In my data, Chobani Flip’s average observed price is $1.31/Unit, so I approximate its marginal cost
as 1.31× 0.78 = 1.02/Unit.
30Coupons of retailers are typically valid for up to one year. For example, coupons from Fresh Grocer typically
expire within 1 to 8 weeks; coupons from CVS typically expire within 4 to 12 weeks; e-vouchers from Target typically
expire within half a year.
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which represents the value of customizing coupons for targeted pricing. From “Case 2: Uniform
Non-Expirable Coupons” to “Case 4: Uniform Expirable Coupons”, the NPV does not increase at
all, which suggests that by adding a uniform expiration date to the coupon, the cost of filtering out
“late” redemption counteracts its benefit. Comparing “Case 3: Targeted Non-Expirable Coupons”
and “Case 5: Targeted Expirable Coupons”, the result shows that adding targeted expiration dates
is valuable, as it increases the NPV from $74 to $78 (+5%). To sum up, the optimal targeted
one-time expirable coupons that are applicable for the first-time purchase of Chobani Flip could
enhance the product’s NPV by 55% (from $50 to $78). This NPV gain comes from three sources: (1)
approximately 1/2 of this NPV gain (from $50 to $64) comes from intertemporal price discrimination
that leverages the learning process; (2) approximately 1/3 of this NPV gain (from $64 to $74) comes
from coupon customization for targeted pricing; and (3) approximately 1/6 of this NPV gain (from
$74 to $78) comes from adding the targeted expiration dates to the coupons.
Figure 1.12: The Resulting NPVs
Note: Case 1: No Coupons. Case 2: Uniform Non-Expirable Coupons. Case 3: Targeted
Non-Expirable Coupons. Case 4: Uniform Expirable Coupons. Case 5: Targeted Expirable
Coupons. Case 6: Targeted Expirable Coupons Based on the Assigned Pseudo Types. Case 7:
Targeted Expirable Coupons Based on the Predicted Pseudo Types. Case 8: Targeted
Expirable Coupons Based on the Predicted Type Distributions.
Figure 1.13 shows the strategies targeted at different consumers in “Case 5: Targeted Expirable
Coupons”. I use the pseudo types for this summary. The coupon designs are very different across
consumers, so the ability to target is valuable.














































































Figure 1.13: The Targeted Strategies
Note: The graph presents the 95% confidence intervals of the results of the consumers who
belong to each specific pseudo type. Here the 95% confidence interval is calculated as
[µ̄− 1.96σ̂, µ̄+ 1.96σ̂], where µ̄ is the mean, and σ̂ is the standard error.
$1.31/Unit, the observed average price), the average coupon value is $2.58, i.e., close to 100%
off the shelf price. The average expiration time is 14 weeks.
Pseudo Type II. The average shelf price is $1.45/Unit (+10% vs. the benchmark price), the
average coupon value is $0.05, i.e., 3% off the shelf price. The average expiration time is 12 weeks.
Pseudo Type III. The average shelf price is $2.30/Unit (+75% vs. the benchmark price), the
average coupon value is $0.73, i.e., 30% off the shelf price. The average expiration time is 13 weeks.
1.6.4 The Practical Implementation of the Targeted Coupon Designs
The NPV increase from “Case 4: Uniform Expirable Coupons” to “Case 5: Targeted Expirable
Coupons” is only a theoretical result because in practice, it is impossible to know the individual
type information, (π̄i1, π̄i2, π̄i3). One way to overcome this obstacle is to predict each consumer’s
type information and use the predicted information for targeting.
For a case study, I use the household demographics provided by Nielsen’s consumer surveys to
predict consumers’ individual type information and compute the NPV-maximizing targeted coupon
designs (in Case 5). In my sample, 12 variables have nonzero variations. Table 1.4 presents the
summary statistics of these variables.
For each consumer, I use her pseudo type as the dependent variable, and run the Multinomial
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Table 1.4: Demographics of the Sample Households
Obs. Min 25th Median 75th Max Mean Std. Dev.
Household Size 428 1 1 2 3 7 2.38 1.27
Income 428 3 18 23 26 27 21.54 5.72
Male Head 428 0 0 1 1 1 0.70 0.46
Age (M) 428 0 5 7 8 9 6.42 2.53
Age (F) 428 0 0 6 9 9 4.98 3.59
Have Children 428 0 0 0 0 1 0.19 0.39
Age Of Children 428 1 9 9 9 9 7.86 2.44
Education Level (M) 428 0 3 5 5 6 4.15 1.56
Education Level (F) 428 0 0 4 5 6 3.02 2.21
Single 428 0 0 0 0 1 0.16 0.36
Married 428 0 0 1 1 1 0.62 0.49
Divorced 428 0 0 0 0 1 0.14 0.35
Employed (M) 428 0 0 1 1 1 0.70 0.46
Employed (F) 428 0 0 1 1 1 0.51 0.50
Note: (1) Age (M): the age of the male household head (if the head is male). Age (F): the age of
the female head (if the head is female). Education Level (M): the education level of the male head
(if the head is male). Education Level (F): the education level of the female head (if the head is
female). Employed (M): whether the male house head is male. Employed (F): whether the female
house head is female. (2) The values of the variables are ordered codes (designated by Nielsen),
the higher the value of the code, the higher the actual value of the variable.
Logit Model.31 Using the estimated model, I obtain (1) the predicted type distribution for each
consumer, and (2) the predicted pseudo type of each consumer. I solve the problem in the following
three cases:
Case 6: Targeted Expirable Coupons Based on the Assigned Pseudo Types. I use the
pseudo types to design the targeted expirable coupons.
Case 7: Targeted Expirable Coupons Based on the Predicted Pseudo Types. I use
the predicted pseudo types for the design.
Case 8: Targeted Expirable Coupons Based on the Predicted Type Distributions. I
use the predicted type distributions for the design.
Panel B of Figure 1.12 shows that the NPV increase from “Case 4: Uniform Expirable Coupons”
to “Case 6: Targeted Expirable Coupons Based on the Assigned Pseudo Types” is 98% of the
31While the pseudo types are not exactly consumers’ actual type information, I will later show that using pseudo
types, theoretically, can recover 98% of the NPV gain generated from perfect targeting that uses the actual individual-
level type information, which suggests that in my case, pseudo types are a good approximation to the actual type
information. Ideally, one wants to directly predict the value of π̄ij . In my case, however, many values of π̄ij are
extremely close to 0 (< 10−10) or 1 (> 10 − 10−10), making it difficult to convert those values to some continuous
measures that can be used in a prediction model (such as an OLS regression model). Therefore, I opt for using the
pseudo types and a classification model such as the Multinomial Logit Model.
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theoretical NPV increase from “Case 4: Uniform Expirable Coupons” to “Case 5: Targeted Expirable
Coupons”. Therefore, by training a sufficiently accurate classification model on pseudo types, can
achieve up to 98% of the theoretical NPV gain achieved by perfect targeting. However, the predictors
(i.e., the demographic information provided by Nielsen) and the model (i.e, the Multinomial Logit
Model) used in this case study did not ideally achieve this goal: Compared with “Case 4: Uniform
Expirable Coupons”, the NPV decreases by 36% in “Case 7: Targeted Expirable Coupons Based
on the Predicted Pseudo Types” and the NPV decreases by 2% in “Case 8: Targeted Expirable
Coupons Based on the Predicted Type Distributions”.32 Therefore, in practice, unless one has (1) a
large sample,33 (2) a more precise prediction tool, and (3) higher-quality predictors, the inaccurate
targeted pricing can do even worse than a uniform strategy.
1.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In the retailing industry, consumers tend to exhibit state dependence, such as consumer learning.
Coupons help firms profit from this demand change through automatic intertemporal price discrim-
ination and price customization. This chapter empirically studies the optimal design of coupons
and quantifies the value of coupons in the Greek Yogurt market, where consumers exhibit learning
behavior. I document a one-time own-product passive learning process in this market, and I find
that using the targeted one-time expirable coupons for a new product, Chobani Flip, can enhance
the product’s NPV by 55%. This NPV gain comes from three sources: (1) approximately 1/2 of this
NPV gain comes from the intertemporal price discrimination that leverages the learning process; (2)
approximately 1/3 of the NPV gain comes from targeted pricing, as the coupon designs vary starkly
across consumers (respectively resulting in 100%, 3%, and 30% off the regular price for different
32By using the predictors and the Multinomial Logit Model, I also re-solve the NPV-maximization problem in
“Case 3: Targeted Non-Expirable Coupons”. I can achieve 2% of the NPV gain from “Case 2: Uniform Non-Expirable
Coupons” to “Case 3: Targeted Non-Expirable Coupons”. Regardless, the results reveal the poor accuracy of predicting
the individual type information.
33It is not just about larger sample size. The distribution of the types across consumers also needs to be more
balanced. In my case, 2/3 of consumers belong to Pseudo Type II, which reflects the fact that the current type
distribution is not balanced. It is difficult to achieve a high prediction accuracy when the distribution of the outcome
variable is severely unbalanced.
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consumers); and (3) the remaining 1/6 of this NPV gain comes from adding the targeted expiration
time on the coupons, respectively, 14 weeks, 12 weeks, and 13 weeks across different consumers.
Future research should explore how to achieve the theoretical NPV gain from the targeted coupon
designs, by combining modern tools such as machine learning, with more valuable information on
predictors, and larger samples. Also, in this study, consumers are not redeeming coupons in a
forward-looking manner. If consumers are forward-looking, adding an expiration date may generate
an additional source of benefit as it may prompt consumers to shift their future purchases to a time
within the coupon validity window. Finally, this study assumes that consumers always use coupons
when they are making the first-time purchases. To this day and age, where consumers can carry
an electronic version of coupons in phones, this should be a reasonable assumption. The cognitive
cost associated with using coupons, however, may be difficult to eliminate. Future research should
study the effect of the different factors that influence consumers’ coupon redemption decisions on
the results of this chapter if more valuable data is available. Chapter 2 indeed studies a case where
the voucher redemption rate is only 39%, and where coupons (vouchers), are of paper version and
are only acceptable at specific marketplaces. In that case, as will be shown in the next chapter,
recognizing and modeling the endogenous voucher redemption is essential to solving some other
big-picture questions.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Appendix I: Details on Sample Construction and Variable Opera-
tionalization
The Consumer Panel Data track household purchases at the shopping trip level. The data lack the
price information for the “Consumer-Time-Store-Product”-level observations where the consumer
did not purchase the product. If someone else in the data visited the same store and purchased this
product at the same time, the price information from these data points can apply to the data points
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that lack the price information. If no one else in the data visited the same store or purchased this
same product at the same time, there is no way to impute the price of the product for that data
point by simply using the Consumer Panel Data.
In that case, I impute the missing prices using the Nielsen Retailer Scanner Data, which has
weekly aggregate sales and weekly prices of each product at different stores. The Retailer Scanner
Data is at the weekly level, so to merge the information from the Consumer Panel Data and the
Retailer Scanner Data, I compile the consumer Panel Data into the weekly-level data. If a consumer
visited more than one store during a single week,34 I impute this week’s missing product prices using
the store where her purchased volume of Greek Yogurt is the highest during this week. If a tie still
exists, I use the store where her spending on Greek Yogurt is the highest during this week. If a store
has no sales of a product during a week, there is no way to impute the price from either dataset. In
that case, I treat the product as being unavailable in that store during that week. Given the way I
define product availability, the eight products are available during 88% to 100% of the 87 weeks.
1.8.2 Appendix II: Does Unobserved Marketing Information Matter?
Intuitively, consumers’ purchasing behavior tends to be also influenced by advertising intensity,
shelf space, etc. I do not have data on these variables, so I refer to the information about them
as unobserved marketing information. To examine whether unobserved marketing information is
something important to account for in my empirical analysis, I estimate the Random-Effects Tobit
Model that nests the specification in my main text by including an 87×1 vector in each j’s regression
that indicates the current week index. This way, I capture the variation in any unobserved marketing
variables related to each product. Table 1.5 presents a comparison of AIC and BIC between the two
cases: (1) excluding, and (2) including the weekly fixed effects:35
(i) Compared with (1), AIC of (2) is higher by 0.06%;
34Overall, this is a rare case in the Greek Yogurt market — 2.7% of the total weeks in my data have this situation.
35For each product, I calculate the change in AIC and BIC as I switch from (1) to (2). The reported changes in the
values of AIC and BIC in the text are the changes averaged across the eight products, which are also the values in
the row “Average” in Table 1.5.
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(ii) Compared with (1), BIC of (2) is higher by 6.17%.
By the calculation rules of AIC and BIC, the lower the values of AIC and BIC, the better.
Therefore, (2) is better than (1) in explaining consumers’ purchasing behavior. Finally, in (2),
only 8% of the time fixed effects are statistically nonzero at the 5% confidence level.36 Therefore,
unobserved marketing information, as controlled for by the time fixed effects, is shown to play a
relatively minor role.
Table 1.5: How Does the Inclusion of Weekly Fixed Effects Change Model Fit?
AIC
Excluded Included Change (%)
Chobani 38,051 38,037 −0.04
Dannon Nonfat 7,057 7,128 +1.01
Dannon Oikos 9,117 9,180 +0.69
Fage 4,298 4,339 +0.95
Chobani Flip 1,785 1,753 −1.79
Dannon Light & Fit 4,322 4,320 −0.05
Muller Quaker Greek Corner 3,098 3,089 −0.29
Yoplait 8,167 8,169 +0.02
Average +0.06
BIC
Not Included Included Change (%)
Chobani 38,145 38,864 +1.88
Dannon Nonfat 7,150 7,948 +11.16
Dannon Oikos 9,210 10,000 +8.58
Fage 4,392 5,163 +17.55
Chobani Flip 1,870 1,938 +3.64
Dannon Light & Fit 4,411 4,513 +2.31
Muller Quaker Greek Corner 3,186 3,281 +2.98
Yoplait 8,255 8,360 +1.27
Average +6.17
Note: (1) Change (%): The change in the value of AIC and BIC as we switch
from the case with the weekly fixed effects excluded to the case with the weekly
fixed effects included. (2) Average: The average of the values under the column
“Change (%)”.
36The proportions of fixed effects that statistically deviate from zero at the 5% confidence level for each product
are: Chobani 8.13%, Dannon Nonfat 0, Dannon Oikos 0, Fage 0, Chobani Flip 35.71%, Dannon Light & Fit 7.14%,
Muller Quaker Greek Corner 0, Yoplait 14.28%.
37
1.8.3 Appendix III: Analyses of Decisions on Whether to Purchase and
the Quantity Purchased Conditional on Purchasing
In this appendix, I conduct an additional analysis where (1) I analyze consumers’ binary decisions
on whether to purchase a product by running the Fixed-Effects Logistic regressions that have the
same covariates as the Tobit model used in the main text; and (2) I analyze consumers’ weekly
purchasing volume of a product conditional on purchasing the product by running the Fixed-Effects
OLS regressions that have the same covariates as the Tobit model used in the main text. Figure
1.14 and 1.15 show the results. Similar to what I show in the main text, the findings are twofold:
(1) consumers tend to purchase a new product more frequently, and tend to increase the quantity
purchased of the product conditional on purchasing the product after purchasing the first unit of the
product; and (2) purchasing the subsequent units of the product or purchasing the other products
have a notably smaller effect, compared to (1).







































































Figure 1.14: Own and Cross Effects of Past Buying Experience on the Log Odds of Purchasing
Each New Product
Note: (1) Own Effect: The change in the log odds of purchasing the product as a function of
the cumulative quantity purchased of the product in the past, compared to the benchmark
scenario, where the consumer has not yet purchased any product. (2) Cross Effect: The
average change in the log odds of purchasing the product as a function of the cumulative
quantity purchased of the other products in the past, compared to the benchmark scenario,
where the consumer has not yet purchased any product.
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Figure 1.15: Own and Cross Effects of Past Buying Experience on the Quantity Purchased of Each
New Product Conditional on Purchasing the Product
Note: (1) Own Effect: The change in the quantity purchased of a product conditional on
purchasing the product as a function of the cumulative quantity purchased of the product in
the past, compared to the benchmark scenario, where the consumer has not yet purchased
any product. (2) Cross Effect: The average change in the quantity purchased of a product
conditional on purchasing the product as a function of the cumulative quantity purchased of
the other products in the past, compared to the benchmark scenario, where the consumer has
not yet purchased any product.
1.8.4 Appendix IV: The Method of Data Approximation to Limit the
Size of the Choice Set
To control the dimensionality of the choice set, I limit the number of quantity choices and product
choices as follows:
First, I notice that 99.17% of the weekly observations in my data involve the simultaneous
purchase of fewer than three products, so I cap the number of products chosen during each week
at 2. If the consumer purchased more than two products during a single week, I keep only the two
products of which the consumer purchased the highest quantities during that week. If a tie still
exists, I keep only the two products on which the consumer spent the most during that week.
Second, I approximate quantities falling within each specified interval with a specific quantity (I
refer to this quantity as the representative quantity). I notice that 46% of the purchased quantities
are between 1 and 3; 36% of the purchased quantities are between 4 and 6; 7% of the purchased
quantities are between 7 and 9; and 11% of the purchased quantities are higher than 9. This
motivates the following four-interval specification: When the quantity is 1 to 3 (a small quantity),
I approximate the quantity as the weighted average of the observed quantities that are equal to 1
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to 3, denoted by q̂j1 ≡ Ê[qjt|1 ≤ qjt ≤ 3]. When the quantity is 4 to 6 (a medium quantity), I
approximate the quantity as q̂j2 ≡ Ê[qjt|4 ≤ qjt ≤ 6]; when the quantity is 7 to 9 (a large quantity),
I approximate the quantity as q̂j3 ≡ Ê[qjt|7 ≤ qjt ≤ 9]; and when the quantity is more than 9
(an extra-large quantity), I approximate the quantity as q̂j4 ≡ Ê[qjt|qjt ≥ 10]. For Chobani, for
example, the four representative quantities are respectively q̂11 = 2.07, q̂12 = 4.81, q̂13 = 7.82, and
q̂14 = 13.82.
The three-interval specification is as follows: When the quantity is 1 to 5 (a small quantity), I
approximate the quantity as Ê[qjt|1 ≤ qjt ≤ 5]; when the quantity is 6 to 10 (a medium quantity),
I approximate the quantity as Ê[qjt|6 ≤ qjt ≤ 10]; and when the quantity is higher than 10 (a large
quantity), I approximate the quantity as Ê[qjt|qjt ≥ 11].
The six-interval specification is as follows: When the quantity is 1 to 2 (an extra-small quantity),
I approximate the quantity as Ê[qjt|1 ≤ qjt ≤ 2]; when the quantity is 3 to 4 (a small quantity),
I approximate the quantity as Ê[qjt|3 ≤ qjt ≤ 4]; when the quantity is 5 to 6 (a below-average
quantity), I approximate the quantity as Ê[qjt|5 ≤ qjt ≤ 6]; when the quantity is 7 to 8 (an above-
average quantity), I approximate the quantity as Ê[qjt|7 ≤ qjt ≤ 8]; when the quantity is 9 to 10 (a
large quantity), I approximate the quantity as Ê[qjt|9 ≤ qjt ≤ 10]; and when the quantity is higher
than 10 (an extra-large quantity), I approximate the quantity as Ê[qjt|qjt ≥ 11].
The aggregate purchased quantities of each product computed from the approximated data are
the same as from the raw data because I compute the representative quantities as the weighted aver-
age of the actual quantities by using the pooled observations. However, at the individual level, each
consumer’s aggregate quantity purchased of each product computed from using the approximated
data can deviate from the value computed from the raw data. For each consumer, I calculate her
aggregate quantity purchased of each product using the representative quantities. Let ŷij denote
this individual-level aggregate quantity, where i denotes consumers and j denotes products. Then,
I repeat the calculation using the raw data. Let yij denote this calculation result. The error rate
at the individual-product-level is given by rij = |(ŷij − yij)/yij |. The product-level average error
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rate is the average of rij across consumers: r̄j =
∑I
i=1 rij/I, where I is the number of consumers
in the sample. Figure 1.16 compares the error rates across the three specifications. The average
error rates are respectively 19.61%, 11.81%, and 8.71% as the number of intervals increases from
3, to 4, and to 6. As the number of intervals increases from 3 to 4, the drop in the average er-
ror rates is 40%. As the number of intervals increases from 4 to 6, the drop in the average error
rates is 26%. Therefore, the drop in the average error rate is relatively small as we increase the
number of intervals from 4 to 6. The sizes of the choice set are respectively 277, 481, and 1,057 as
the numbers of intervals adopted are respectively 3, 4, and 6. Expanding the choice set generates
higher computational burden and underflow issues.37 Balancing (1) accuracy and (2) computation,
the four-interval specification appears to be the most ideal among the three specifications. Figure
1.17 shows that the four-interval specification has a minimal effect on the critical variation in the
raw datasets. In this analysis, I re-estimate the Tobit model in Section 1.2 using the approximated
data obtained under the four-interval specification. Figure 1.17 shows a close match between the
regression results using the raw data and the approximated data.
1.8.5 Appendix V: The Empirical Identifiability of the Model: Parameter
Recovery Exercise
To show that the structural is empirically identifiable, I simulate 100 datasets from the estimated
Two-Latent-Class model and use the simulated datasets to re-estimate the model. Figure 1.18 shows
that every true parameter value is covered by the 95% confidence interval of the 100 estimates.38
Therefore, the MLE method can recover the model parameters accurately.
37The smallest number recognizable by typical computing softwares such as MATLAB is 9.8813 × 10−324. Any
value lower than that is regarded as 0 by the software. As the choice set becomes large, a large number of choices
would have a choice probability that is sufficiently small to end up being recognized as 0 by the computing software,
causing inaccurate estimates by the MLE method.
38For some parameters, the values assigned to them end up generating no choice of specific product and quantity
in some of the simulated datasets. If we use these simulated samples for estimation, the corresponding parameters
would not be empirically identified and could result in extreme estimates of these parameters. That is why the 95%
confidence intervals appear abnormally wide for these parameters.
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Figure 1.16: Average Error Rates Using the Approximated Data
Note: (1) Method I specifies three intervals; Method II specifies four intervals; and Method III
specifies six intervals. (2) Product 9: The sum of the purchased quantities across the eight
products. (3) Calculation Method: For each consumer, I calculate her aggregate quantity
purchased of each product using the representative quantities. Let ŷij denote this
individual-level aggregate quantity, where i denotes consumers and j denotes products. Then,
I repeat the calculation using the raw data. Let yij denote this calculation result. The error
rate at the product-individual level is given by rij = |(ŷij − yij)/yij |. The product-level
average error rate is the average of rij across consumers: r̄j =
∑I
i=1 rij/I, where I is the
number of consumers in the sample.
1.8.6 Appendix VI: Robustness Checks for Cross-Validation Errors
For robustness checks of the cross validation exercise, I conduct 70%-30% and 90%-10% training-test
divisions. The results show that the pattern of the cross-validation errors is robust and is in favor
of the Three-Latent-Class model. The process of the calculation of the cross-validation errors is the
same as in the main text.
1.8.7 Appendix VII: Discussion on the Assumptions Imposed When Solv-
ing the NPV-Maximization Problems
Assumption 1 is supported by the fact that the price differences are trivial across the three pseudo
types of consumers in my data — the average prices of Chobani are $1.11/Unit, $1.11/Unit, $1.09/Unit;
the average prices of Dannon Nonfat are $1.04/Unit, $1.04/Unit, $1.02/Unit; the average prices of
Dannon Oikos are $1.04/Unit, $1.04/Unit, $1.02/Unit; the average prices of Fage are $1.29/Unit,
42





















































































































Figure 1.17: The Comparison of the Tobit Regression Results Between Using the Raw and
Approximated Data
Note: The horizontal axis is the coefficient index (32 coefficients). The vertical axis shows the
coefficient estimates. Each panel shows the coefficient estimates (and their 95% confidence
intervals) associated with each of the eight products.
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PANEL A: PRE-LEARNING UTILTITY OF TYPE 1
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PANEL C: PRICE COEFFICIENT OF TYPE 1
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PANEL C: PRE-LEARNING UTILTITY OF TYPE 2
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PANEL E: PRICE COEFFICIENT OF TYPE 2
True Values
Estimates
Figure 1.18: Parameter Recovery Results
Note: The plot compares the true parameter values and the 95% confidence intervals of the
estimates that are calculated from 100 randomly generated samples.




































Figure 1.19: Robustness Checks for Cross-Validation Errors
Note: Panel A uses the 70%-30% training-test division and Panel B uses the 90%-10%
training-test division.
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$1.28/Unit, $1.22/Unit; the average prices of Chobani Flip are $1.33/Unit, $1.32/Unit, $1.30/Unit;
the average prices of Dannon Light & Fit are $3.65/Unit, $3.64/Unit, and $3.61/Unit; the average
price of Muller Quaker Greek Corner are $1.04/Unit, $1.04/Unit, $1.02/Unit; the average prices of
Yoplait are $1.08/Unit, $1.07/Unit, and $1.07/Unit. This pattern suggests that in practice, in the
retailing business, supermarkets or grocery stores may not be able to effectively screen the consumer
type information. As a result, consumers do not face significantly differentiated net prices.
Two facts support Assumption 2: First, by running an OLS regression of each product’s prices
on the other products’ prices, I find that its competitors’ prices respond very weakly to the product’s
price change. Take Chobani Flip for example, everything else equal, +$1.00/Unit price change of
Chobani Flip leads to only +$0.12/Unit, +$0.01/Unit, −$0.01/Unit, +$0.12/Unit, −$0.02/Unit,
+$0.02/Unit, +$0.07/Unit price change of the other seven products. Second, prices exhibit an
almost zero time-trend — through fitting a linear time trend model, the price changes of the eight
products over a 56-week (one-year) horizon are respectively $0.02/Unit, −$0.03/Unit, −$0.03/Unit,
−$0.003/Unit, +$0.13/Unit, +$0.13/Unit, −$0.05/Unit, −$0.08/Unit.
For Assumption 3, products are available for the most of the time since the entry of a new product.
Take Chobani Flip for example, since its entry, the other products are available for respectively 100%,
94%, 94%, 96%, 95%, 91%, and 88% of the 87 weeks.
1.8.8 Appendix VIII: The Optimal Coupon Designs and the Resulting
NPVs Under a 20% Annual Discount Rate
In this appendix, I study the case with an annual discount rate 20%, which is equivalent to setting
the weekly discount factor δ = 0.99. Figure 1.20 and Figure 1.21 show the results are similar between
the two different annual discount rates.
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Figure 1.20: The Resulting NPVs
Note: Case 1: No Coupons. Case 2: Uniform Non-Expirable Coupons. Case 3: Targeted
Non-Expirable Coupons. Case 4: Uniform Expirable Coupons. Case 5: Targeted Expirable
Coupons. Case 6: Targeted Expirable Coupons Based on the Assigned Pseudo Types. Case 7:
Targeted Expirable Coupons Based on the Predicted Pseudo Types. Case 8: Targeted












































































Figure 1.21: The Targeted Strategies
Note: The graph presents the 95% confidence intervals of the results of the consumers who
belong to each specific pseudo type. Here the 95% confidence interval is calculated as
[µ̄− 1.96σ̂, µ̄+ 1.96σ̂], where µ̄ is the mean, and σ̂ is the standard error.
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1.8.9 Appendix IX: The Convergence of Finite-Horizon NPV-Maximizing
Solutions to Infinite-Horizon NPV-Maximizing Solutions
This appendix conducts a case study where Chobani Flip solves the NPV-maximization problem in
“Case III: Targeted Non-expirable Coupons” using an annual discount rate of 5%. The finite-horizon
case is an extreme situation where the firm completely ignores the profits that come after certain
time.
Figure 1.22 shows that the finite-horizon optimal coupon designs and the resulting NPVs numer-
ically converge to the infinite-horizon solutions as the horizon expands beyond 25 weeks (6 months).

























PANEL B: SHELF PRICE
INFINITE-HORIZON
FINITE-HORIZON

















PANEL C: COUPON VALUE
INFINITE-HORIZON
FINITE-HORIZON
Figure 1.22: The Finite-Horizon v.s. Infinite-Horizon Solutions
Note: The results are obtained under Scenario III, with discount factor δ = 0.999107. In






A wide array of industries have been using loyalty programs to consolidate customer loyalty and
to increase profits. However, the effectiveness of loyalty programs in achieving these purposes, and
the management cost associated with maintaining them, have always been a concern. McKinsey &
Company states that loyalty programs cost $50 billion a year for U.S. companies. In the meantime,
54% of loyalty memberships are indeed inactive. In 2018, the credit card company, American Express,
shut down its loyalty program, Plenti, as the program was not working effectively as expected.
Figure 2.1: Starbucks Rewards Program
48
Among the different types of loyalty programs, non-tiered loyalty programs remain one of the
most common types of loyalty programs adopted by the retailing industry (Breugelmans et al.,
2014). However, a concern often raised about a non-tiered program is its apparently weak financial
incentives and a lack of explicit goals for its members. In the non-tiered programs, consumers
typically get a fixed-valued reward for every fixed number of loyalty points collected. Under this
linear rule, consumers repeat the process of “investing” numerous purchases or a large amount of
spending before “harvesting” a fixed-valued reward, which ultimately amounts to getting a relatively
small price discount compared with many other short-term promotions on the market. For example,
members of the Starbucks Rewards Program (see Figure 2.1) earn one star per dollar spent at a
physical Starbucks store; then they can later redeem the stars for free items. To get a hot coffee
that is on average worth $3, consumers need to cash in 50 stars, which is equivalent to spending $50
to get a $3 reward. To get an iced espresso drink that is on average worth $5, consumers need to
cash in 150 stars, which is equivalent to spending $150 to get a $5 reward. Ultimately, the program
only generates a 4% to 6% discount. Starbucks itself offers 50% off for handcrafted drinks and “buy
one and get one free” promotions every month,1 Therefore, the price discounts generated by the
program are not very significant.
This chapter studies a similar setting: a non-tiered credit card loyalty program. For every dollar
spent with the credit card, cardholders earn 0.2 points, 0.5 points, or 1.0 point across different stores.
Every month, at the end of the credit card billing cycle, the program automatically converts the
collected loyalty points into vouchers based on a linear rule — it converts every 500 points into a $5
voucher. In this program, loyalty points do not expire, and any non-convertible points automatically
carry over to the next billing cycle. The $5 vouchers serve as $5 discounts. They can be redeemed
in around 10% of the national retailers. Given this reward policy, cardholders must spend $500 to
$2,500 using the credit card to earn a $5 price discount, which amounts to a 0.2% to 1% discount.2
1A lot of other non-tiered loyalty programs share the same “weak discount” feature. For example, an online loyalty
program, “Drop,” rewards consumers with loyalty points for shopping at partner stores online. The points can be
redeemed for gift cards. The resulting price discount ranges from 2% to 10%, while the partner stores (such as Macy’s)
themselves offer regular price discounts that range from 20% to 40%.
2Cardholders need to spend $2500 in a store that offers 0.2 points/dollar, or $500 in a store that offers 1.0
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Given the small discounts it offers, would the program effectively incentivize cardholders to
increase their credit card spending? If so, what are the reasons? In this chapter, I use the detailed
real-time records on 621 consumers’ (1) credit card transactions, (2) loyalty points earning activity,
(3) voucher earning activity, and (4) voucher redemption activity, to answer the above questions.
I assess the effectiveness of the program in driving credit card spending increases. I distinguish
between two different reasons why the non-tiered program would drive consumers to increase their
credit card spending; and, through a structural modeling approach, I measure their significance
in my empirical setting. Then I explore how to leverage the two reasons to improve the current
program design to achieve a win-win outcome, including (1) a profit increase for the credit card
company, and (2) a welfare increase for cardholders. The program’s reward policy has two different
features: (1) the amount of credit card spending required for getting a voucher, and (2) the voucher
face value. If consumers only care about the resulting discounts from voucher redemption, then
altering either feature would have the same consequence, as either of them have the same effect on
the resulting discount rates. If consumers also care about the other reasons than just the resulting
discount, altering feature (1) is no longer equivalent to altering feature (2) in generating consumer
incentives.
I propose a theoretical framework that incorporates the following two processes through which
the non-tiered loyalty program incentivizes consumers to increase their credit card spending: an
economic mechanism and a psychological mechanism. In each period, a consumer makes a two-
dimensional decision on (1) the amount of credit card spending, and (2) the number of vouchers to
redeem (given the voucher stock she has).
In the economic mechanism, consumers are forward-looking with rational expectation. The
economic mechanism incentivizes consumers through the option value of earning vouchers. This
option value derives from the utility flows that consumers would receive when they potentially
redeem their vouchers in the future. The utility flow is the sum of two parts: (1) the benefit of the
points/dollar, to earn 500 points.
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resulting discount; (2) a lump-sum cost that reflects the inconvenience associated with the process
of redeeming the paper-version vouchers.3 If the benefit is higher (lower), or the redemption cost is
lower (higher), the utility from redemption would be higher (lower). Consumers would more (less)
actively redeem, and this, in turn, generates a higher (lower) option value of earning vouchers, a
higher (lower) incentive to earn vouchers, and thus a higher (lower) incentive to earn loyalty points.
If voucher redemption is unlikely to occur, the effect of the economic mechanism on credit card
spending would also be zero.
In the psychological mechanism, consumers earn loyalty points to achieve goals. The literature
on goal pursuits such as Allen et al. (2016) and Markle et al. (2018) find that agents in marathons,
puzzle-solving tasks, and fund-raising events form goals and receive satisfaction from achieving them.
Loyalty programs are similar to those settings in the sense that consumers have to reach a certain
threshold to earn any reward. In my model, consumers treat the extrinsic thresholds established
by the program as goals and receive satisfaction (modeled as a utility flow) once their credit card
spending triggers their points stock reaching a new goal. The satisfaction from goal achievement
thus incentivizes consumers to more actively earn loyalty points through credit card spending.
I identify the economic mechanism using the information on (1) the observed redemption behav-
ior, and (2) the variation of credit card spending activity as the consumer’s voucher stock varies.
The psychological mechanism is identified by the “residual” variation of credit card spending activity
as the consumer’s points stock varies that cannot be rationalized by the economic mechanism.
To account for individual heterogeneity, I estimate the model in the form of a latent class frame-
work. The estimates reveal four types of consumers. The results show considerable heterogeneity
in (1) credit card spending, as it ranges from $53/week to $234/week across the four types, and
in (2) voucher redemption activity, as the shares of vouchers redeemed range from 0.19 to 0.81
across the four types. Consumers incur a substantial redemption cost in the form of disutility, as
3Stourm et al. (2015) use a fixed redemption cost to capture the cognitive cost associated with deciding on how to
use the discount. Besides what is captured by Stourm et al. (2015), the redemption cost in this study also incorporates
the inconvenience related to the process of redeeming the paper-version vouchers that may come from transportation
and consumers’ interactions with staff and machines.
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the estimates of the disutility range from 4.09 to 5.47 across the four types. Consumers receive a
significant satisfaction from goal achievement, and they find hitting the higher threshold of 1,000
points considerably more attractive than hitting the lower one of 500 points.
Using the model estimates, I conduct counterfactual experiments to address the following ques-
tions: (1) Is the current loyalty program effective in increasing cardholders’ credit card spending?
How effective is it? What is the relative effectiveness of the economic and psychological mecha-
nisms? (2) How can we improve the current program to enhance profits for the credit card company,
meanwhile enhancing cardholders’ welfare? To calculate profits, I assume the revenues for the credit
card company come from (1) the credit card processing fees paid by merchants when consumers use
the credit card, and (2) the interest and late fees paid by cardholders. To calculate the cost faced
by the credit card company, I use the institutional fact that the company pays 90% of the voucher
values to a merchant when consumers redeem the vouchers at the merchant. I calculate the changes
in cardholders’ welfare as the changes in the total value of vouchers redeemed minus the changes in
the total interest and late fees.
In answering the first set of questions, I find that the current program increases cardholders’
credit card spending by 5.7%, and increases the profit for the company by 5.1%; 89% of this spending
increase is driven by the psychological mechanism, which suggests that the psychological mechanism
is notably more effective than the economic mechanism.
In answering the second set of questions, I consider two candidate policy changes: (1) increasing
the points issued per dollar spent (points issuance ratios), and (2) increasing the voucher face value.
Policy change (1) leverages both the economic and psychological mechanisms, while policy change
(2) leverages only the economic mechanism. I find that policy change (1) would result in a profit
increase for the credit card company, but a welfare decrease for cardholders; policy change (2)
would result in a profit decrease for the credit card company, but a welfare increase for cardholders.
Therefore, the program needs to increase both points issuance ratios and voucher face values to
achieve a win-win outcome, where both the profit and the welfare increase. I also find that if the
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program can effectively eliminate the fixed redemption cost, the economic mechanism would become
more effective, and increasing the voucher face value alone can generate win-win outcomes.
The psychological mechanism proposed in this chapter is related to the literature on loyalty
programs and goal pursuit in the following ways: First, similar to Stourm et al. (2015), my framework
builds upon the idea that consumers may attach a psychological value to loyalty points. Second,
Rosch (1975) and Pope and Simonsohn (2011) find that people tend to use the external landmarks as
reference points, such as round numbers and focal colors, when they make decisions. I propose that
consumers use the external reward thresholds established by the loyalty program as goals. Third,
Heath et al. (1999), Allen et al. (2016), and Markle et al. (2018) find that agents are incentivized
to reach goals by a “discrete jump in value” upon reaching the goals. I apply this to my setting:
The discrete utility flow from goal achievement is what incentivizes consumers in the psychological
mechanism.
This study contributes to the literature on loyalty programs and goal pursuit in two major ways:
First, the literature on goal pursuit (Heath et al., 1999; Pope and Simonsohn, 2011; Allen et al.,
2016; Markle et al., 2018) documents goal pursuit as a psychological phenomenon in typical non-
pecuniary settings. This study, through a structural modeling approach, sort out and quantify the
significance of psychological mechanism in a pecuniary setting, where explicit financial incentives
(i.e., vouchers) are present. Second, in studying consumer behavior in loyalty programs, past stud-
ies typically focus on single-dimension decisions. For example, Lewis (2004), Hartmann and Viard
(2008), and Ching and Ishihara (2018) focus only on modeling consumer purchases, assuming the
automatic voucher redemption, due to lack of redemption records. Stourm et al. (2015) focus only
on redemption behavior, assuming exogenous purchases. In this chapter, I model both endogenous
credit card spending and endogenous redemption decisions, which allows me to leverage the records
on voucher stocks and voucher redemption to separate the economic mechanism from the psycholog-
ical mechanism. Overall, this study supplements the literature on loyalty programs by (1) adopting
a structural modeling approach to distinguish between an economic incentive and a psychological
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incentive in a non-tiered loyalty program, and (2) exploring their managerial implications on the
design of non-tiered loyalty programs.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 presents a theoretical model that incor-
porates the economic and psychological mechanisms, and illustrates the distinguishable behaviors
predicted by the two mechanisms. Section 2.3 describes my data for the empirical analyses, and
show the presence of both mechanisms. Section 2.4 presents the structural model and my estimation
method. Section 2.5 shows and discusses the estimation results. Section 2.6 explores the managerial
implications of the estimates. Section 2.7 provides a summary and discussion.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
To illustrate the idea of the two mechanisms and how they incentivize consumers to increase their
credit card spending, I develop a model of consumer choice of credit card spending and the amount
and timing of voucher redemption in Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3. In Section 2.2.4, I illustrate the distin-
guishable behaviors predicted by the two mechanisms through numerical examples. They form the
basis of identification in my empirical analyses in the later sections.
2.2.1 Model Setup
Cardholders earn r̄ points per dollar spent with the credit card. Every billing cycle has T̄ ≡ 4 weeks.
As the current billing cycle reaches the end, each P̄ points are converted into a fixed-valued voucher
and sent to the cardholders together with their credit card bill.
Given this rule, at the end of the last week of the current billing cycle, if a consumer has points
stock below P̄ , then no voucher would be generated as the new billing cycle starts; if she has points
stock above P̄ but below 2P̄ , one voucher would be generated; if she has points stock above 2P̄ but
below 3P̄ , two vouchers would be generated, etc. The points-to-vouchers conversion would not occur
until the end of the billing cycle, so a consumer can have a very high points stock (i.e., it could be
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more than P̄ points, such as 2P̄ , 3P̄ , etc.) during a billing cycle, as long as she earns points very
actively. Once vouchers are generated, the leftover points (fewer than P̄ ) would carry over to the
first week of the next billing cycle with no devaluation. So, for example, if she has 32 P̄ points stock
at the end of the last week in the current billing cycle, she would get one voucher and be left with
1
2 P̄ points stock as the next billing cycle starts.
Let b denote a billing cycle, and t a week. The way the program works yields the following
variables of interest: (1) the Period index within Billing Cycle b,4 (2) the points stock at the
beginning of week t (the weekly initial points stock), (3) the number of points earned (through credit
card spending) during week t, (4) the points stock at the end of week t (the weekly final points stock),
(5) the voucher stock at the beginning of week t (the weekly initial voucher stock), (6) the number
of vouchers redeemed during week t, and (7) the voucher stock at the end of week t (the weekly final
voucher stock). Table 2.1 shows a theoretical snapshot with regard to how these variables evolve in
response to consumer credit card spending and voucher redemption activity. In this program, every
500 points are converted into a voucher, so in this table, P̄ ≡ 500. The table shows that at the
start of Week 1 of Billing Cycle 4, the consumer’s weekly initial points stock is 100, and her weekly
initial voucher stock is 2; during Week 1, the consumer earns 200 points and does not redeem any
voucher, so at the end of Week 1, the consumer’s weekly final points stock is 300, and her weekly
final voucher stock is 2. At the end of Week 4 of Cycle 4, the consumer’s weekly final points stock is
700, and her weekly final voucher stock is 1, so, as the new billing cycle, Cycle 5, starts, 500 points
are converted into one voucher, so the consumer’s weekly initial points stock is 200, and her weekly
initial voucher stock is 2.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between a consumer’s decisions on (1)
the weekly points to earn (through credit card spending) and (2) the weekly vouchers to redeem, vs.
her state variables, including (1) the week index within the billing cycle, (2) her weekly initial points
stock, and (3) her weekly initial voucher stock. The model I present will incorporate two reasons
4As a billing cycle has four weeks, the period index can take the values 0, 1, 2, and 3, referring to Week 0, 1, 2,
and 3 within the current billing cycle.
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Table 2.1: A Theoretical Snapshot of Consumer Activity and Evolution of Variables
Period Index
Initial Initial Earn Redeem Final Final
Points Voucher Points Vouchers Points Voucher
Stock Stock Stock Stock
. . .
Week 1, Cycle 4 100 2 200 0 300 2
Week 2, Cycle 4 300 2 300 1 600 0
Week 3, Cycle 4 600 1 0 0 600 1
Week 4, Cycle 4 600 1 100 0 700 1
Week 1, Cycle 5 200 2 0 2 200 0
. . .
why the loyalty program incentivizes consumers to earn loyalty points beyond having a natural
need to use the credit card, including (1) to earn vouchers that they will potentially redeem in the
future (the economic mechanism); (2) to reach the extrinsic reward thresholds (P̄ , 2P̄ , . . . ), as they
treat reaching those thresholds as achieving goals, which gives them satisfaction (the psychological
mechanism).
2.2.2 Utility Specification
During week t, consumer i decides on the amount of credit card spending, denoted by yit; and
given the weekly initial voucher stock she has, Rit, chooses nit (0 ≤ nit ≤ Rit) vouchers to redeem.
Consumer i has the utility function, U(Pit, Rit, yit, nit, εit). Here, Pit is i’s weekly initial points




is the vector of her utility shocks, with each element εit|yit,nit
being associated with the decision vector (yit, nit). Modeling εit this way, I assume that yit and nit
are both discrete.5 In what follows, I omit subscript i of the variables in my model layout for the
5Naturally, nit is discrete as vouchers cannot be redeemed in fraction. The chosen level of credit card spending,
yit, on the other hand, is theoretically continuous. I discretize yit mainly because the numeric implementation of the
model ultimately requires the discretization of the variable.
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simplicity of notations. The utility is given by:







+ εt|yt,nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility Shock
=−φi [(yt + γ1i)ηi − γηi1i ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
u0i: Opportunity Cost
+
 ψi [(nt + γi)αi − γαii ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
b̄i: Benefit of Price Discount
− ci · 1[nt > 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
c̄i: Redemption Cost
︸ ︷︷ ︸







































f(Gt): Weekly Initial Value of Points
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u2i: Utility From the Psychological Mechanism
+ εt|yt,nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility Shock
(2.2.1)
Here, r̄ is the points issuance ratio. Because vouchers are uniformly worth $5 discounts, I model the
benefit of the resulting discount (b̄i) as a function of the number of vouchers redeemed (nt). The
utility has three major components:
A. The Opportunity Cost. Consumers face an opportunity cost that comes from the forgone
rewards or benefit from other payment methods (such as the other credit cards and cash). In general,
the higher the amount allocated to this credit card, the higher the opportunity cost. Absent the
information about the reward schemes employed by the other companies, I model the opportunity






as in Kim et al. (2002).6 By varying the values of φi and ηi, we obtain different shapes of ui0,
which correspond to different reward schemes adopted by the other companies.
6The term γηi1i serves to normalize ui0 into zero when yt = 0. The parameter γ1i serves to ensure that function ui0
is smooth for a gradient-based estimation method I adopt in my structural estimation. Similar for γ2i in the benefit
57



















































































Figure 2.2: Different Possible Shapes of the Benefit Function
Note: (1) Case 1: the benefit is negative (αi = − 12 ); (2) Case 2: the benefit function is
concave (αi = 12 ); (3) Case 3: the benefit function is linear (αi = 1); (4) Case 4: the benefit
function is convex (αi = 2).
B. The Utility from the Economic Mechanism. The second term (u1i) has two components:
the benefit of the resulting discount, b̄i(nt) = ψi [(nt + γ2i)αi − γαi2i ], and a fixed “cost” the consumer
incurs when she redeems any vouchers, c̄i(nt) = ci · 1[nt > 0]. Lacking the information about the
actual expenditure the consumer incurs,7 I model the benefit of the resulting discount also in a
reduced-form style, using the flexible functional form as in Kim et al. (2002). Figure 2.2 shows
that b̄i can accommodate the possibility of a consumer finding (1) the vouchers not beneficial (b̄i is
negative); (2) bulk redemption not beneficial (b̄i is concave); (3) every voucher equally beneficial (b̄i
is linear); and (4) bulk redemption beneficial (b̄i is convex).8
In terms of the fixed redemption cost, Stourm et al. (2015) use it to capture the cognitive cost
consumers incur when they decide how to spend their rewards. In my setting, this cost may also
reflect the physical inconvenience associated with the process of redeeming the paper-version vouch-
ers.
C. The Utility From the Psychological Mechanism. The utility from the psychological mech-
function of the resulting price discount (b̄i).
7The observed amount a consumer allocates to this credit card is not equal to the actual expenditure she incurs
because she may use cash or other payment methods to pay for their purchases.
8Depending on how the stores’ pricing and reward policies, in Case (1), as a result of using the vouchers, the
consumer may end up spending more than she needs to; in Case (2), the consumer redeems a higher number of
vouchers to get a higher discount for a larger transaction she makes but somehow ends up having a lower discount
rate; in Case (3), the consumer values the resulting discount linearly; and in Case (4), the consumer may value the
resulting discount as a subtracted amount from a fixed expenditure she incurs.
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is the consumer’s weekly
initial number of goals achieved during week t. Here, b·c is floor rounding. Given that P̄ = 500, if
Pt = 100, then Gt = 0, so the weekly initial number of goals achieved is 0; if Pt = 600, then Gt = 1,





is the her weekly
final number of goals achieved if she spends yt using the credit card and earns r̄yt points during
week t. Given that Ḡt ≥ Gt, the consumer hits (Ḡt − Gt) goals at the end of week t by placing
yt on the credit card, so the discrete flow of utility she receives is u2i(Gt, Ḡt) = f(Ḡt) − f(Gt) =





. Table 2.2 shows a numerical example of how the psychological
mechanism works. It shows that at the end of Week 2 of Cycle 6, as credit card spending triggers
the reach of a first goal (i.e., the weekly final points stock passes the threshold of 500 points but is
lower than the threshold of 1,000 points), the consumer receives a utility flow δ0i + δ1i. At the end
of Week 3, no new goal is reached, so the utility flow received is 0. At the end of Week 4, a second
goal is reached (i.e., the weekly final points stock passes the threshold of 1,000 points but is lower
than the threshold of 1,500 points), so the consumer receives a utility flow δ0i+3δ1i. When the next
billing cycle starts, as the weekly initial points stock falls to 200, the weekly initial number of goals
achieved also gets reset into 0.
Table 2.2: How Does the Psychological Mechanism Work?
Period Index
Initial Points Final Initial Final Satisfaction
Points Earned Points Goals Goals Received
Stock Stock Achieved Achieved
. . .
Week 1, Cycle 6 200 200 400 0 0 0
Week 2, Cycle 6 400 500 900 0 1 δ0i + δ1i
Week 3, Cycle 6 900 0 900 1 1 0
Week 4, Cycle 6 900 300 1200 1 2 δ0i + 3δ1i
Week 1, Cycle 7 200 0 200 0︸︷︷︸
RESET TO ZERO
0 0
Week 2, Cycle 7 200 300 500 0 1 δ0i + δ1i
. . .
The number of goals defined in this study is related only to the consumer’s weekly initial points
stock, Pt, rather than the cumulative number of points she has earned since she opened the account.
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This way of modeling uses the concept goal to characterize how consumers attach a psychological
value to their present points stock, a value that is not captured by the economic mechanism.9
The quadratic functional form (f) has only two parameters but is flexible.10 If δ1i is positive
(zero, negative), the consumer has an increasing (decreasing, constant) marginal value of goals,
which would incentivize her to increase (decrease, not change) her credit card spending activity
after she has hit a previous goal.
D. Utility Shocks and the Benchmark Scenario. Finally, the last term, εt|yt,nt , is a utility
shock associated with the decision vector (yt, nt). The utility shock arises as a consumer may
randomly need to spend a certain amount using the credit card and to redeem a certain number of
vouchers, even if there were no loyalty programs. I assume that this utility shock εt|yt,nt is a Type-I
extreme value, which is a typical assumption made in discrete choice models (Rust 1987; Berry et
al. 1995).
The benchmark scenario is where u1i = −∞ and u2i = 0. u1i = −∞ means that no voucher
redemption will occur, so the effect of the economic mechanism is zero; and u2i = 0 means that
there is no satisfaction from goal achievement, so the effect of the psychological mechanism is zero.
Therefore, the benchmark scenario is a setting where both the economic and psychological mecha-
nisms are ineffective. In this case, a consumer’s credit card spending decision is driven solely by the
opportunity cost u0i, and the utility shocks εt.
9I later show in my empirical sections that consumers’ pattern of increased credit card spending activity as they
advance towards the next threshold is persistent regardless of (1) whether I control for a linear time trend, and (2)
the levels of their weekly initial voucher stock. This suggests that consumers are motivated by something currently
present, rather than historically cumulative, in their account. Similarly, Stourm et al. (2015)’s model builds upon
an idea that consumers history-independently and time-invariantly attach a psychological value to the loyalty points
that are present in their account.
10In my data, 99% of the observations have the weekly initial points stock lower than 1,000 points, i.e., most of the
time, consumers are pursuing up to the second goal, which secures the empirical identification of up to two parameters
of the parametric form.
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2.2.3 The Dynamic Programming Problem
Similar to Lewis (2004), Hartmann et al. (2008), and Ching et al. (2019), I model consumers as
forward-looking.11 In what follows, I show how a consumer’s state variables evolve and write down
her dynamic programming problem.
A. Transitions of State Variables. Let Wt denote the week index of week t. Wt = 0 is the first
week within the billing cycle. The transition from Wt into Wt+1 is given by
Wt+1 =

Wt + 1 if Wt < T̄
0 if Wt = T̄
(2.2.2)
The consumer’s points stock increases when she earns loyalty points, and decreases when points are
converted into vouchers at the end of the billing cycle. Therefore, the transition of her weekly initial
points stock, from Pt into Pt+1, is given by
Pt+1 =

Pt + r̄yt if Wt < T̄












is the number of converted points.
The consumer’s voucher stock increases when new vouchers are generated, and decreases when




Rt − nt if Wt < T̄





if Wt = T̄
(2.2.4)







B. The Dynamic Programming Problem and Bellman Equation. Let Ωt ≡ (Pt, Rt,Wt)
11Consumers value loyalty points because they value goal achievement and the resulting discounts from their po-
tential voucher redemption in the future. This requires them to be forward-looking. In addition, my model allows the
flexibility in how forward-looking consumers are as I will discuss the identification of and estimate the value of the
discount factor in the later sections where I structurally estimate the model.
61
denote the vector of the consumer’s state variables, and let Dt ≡ (yt, nt) denote her decision vector.







E[U(Ωs, Ds, εs|θi)|Ωt] (2.2.5)
subject to the state variable transitions (2.2.2), (2.2.3), and (2.2.4). Let βi denote the consumer’s
discount factor, and θi = (φi, ηi, δ0i, δ1i, ψi, αi, ci) the vector of her other parameters. The Bellman
Equation that corresponds to the above dynamic programming problem is given by
V (Ω, ε|θi) = max
D
{U(Ω, D, ε|θi) + βiEV (Ω′|Ω, D, θi)} . (2.2.6)
where V (Ω, ε|θi) and EV (Ω′|Ω, D, θi) are respectively the consumer’s value function and expected
value function conditional on Ω and D.12 The notation Ω′ denotes her next week’s vector of state
variables.
2.2.4 Model Predictions: How Do We Distinguish Between the Economic
and the Psychological Mechanisms?
To empirically distinguish between the economic and psychological mechanisms, I rely on the distin-
guishable credit card spending and voucher redemption behaviors predicted by the two mechanisms.
First, the redemption behavior is an exclusive part of the economic mechanism. Therefore, the
psychological mechanism alone predicts no redemption, while the economic mechanism predicts a
possibly nonzero probability of redemption.
Second, to illustrate the differences in the predicted credit card spending behavior between the
two mechanisms, I visualize them through a numerical example. Specifically, I visualize the rela-
tionship between Week-t credit card spending (calculated as the expected value, E[y|P,R,W = t])
and the weekly initial points stocks (P ) and the weekly initial voucher stocks (R). Appendix 2.8.1
describes how to calculate E[y|P,R,W = t] from my model. The main text shows Week-0 credit
12In this Bellman Equation, I omit the time subscript t as we are looking at a stationary problem with the infinite
horizon.
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card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 0]), and Appendix 2.8.2 shows Week-1, 2, and 3 credit card spending
(i.e., E[y|P,R,W = 1], E[y|P,R,W = 2], and E[y|P,R,W = 3]). The relationships across Week 0,
1, 2, and 3 appear similar.13
A. The Economic Mechanism Uniquely Predicts a Nonzero Correlation Between Credit
Card Spending and Voucher Stocks. Panel 1 of Figure 2.3 shows the “PSYCH ONLY” case
where I suppress the redemption probability to zero, thus omitting the effect of the economic mech-
anism. To do this, I set ci = 15 (a sufficiently large redemption cost). To keep the presence of the
psychological mechanism, I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (3,− 12 ), so there is satisfaction from goal achievement.
Panel 2 shows the “ECON ONLY” case where I omit the effect of the psychological mechanism by
setting (δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0). To keep the presence of the economic mechanism, I set ci = 0, so there is
a nonzero probability of redemption.
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Figure 2.3: Predicted Week-0 Credit Card Spending (A Comparison Between PSYCH ONLY Case
and ECON ONLY Case)
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-0 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 0]), the x-axis depicts
the weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors)
correspond to different weekly initial voucher stocks (R). In the left panel (“PSYCH ONLY”
case), I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (3,− 12 ) and ci = 15). In the right panel (“ECON ONLY” case), I set
(δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) and ci = 0.
In the “PSYCH ONLY” panel, there is no shift of the credit card spending curve (E[y|P,R,W =
0]) when the weekly initial voucher stock (R) varies. Therefore, the “PSYCH ONLY” case pre-
13In the next section, I control for the week indexes in my regression analyses.
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dicts a zero correlation between credit card spending activity and voucher stocks. In the “ECON
ONLY” panel, there is a downward shift of the credit card spending curve when R increases. This
downward shift is not definite. The direction of the shift depends on the specifics of b̄i and ci. In
Appendix 2.8.2, Figure 2.12 shows that when ci is respectively 0, 5, 10, and 15, the curve (i) shifts
downward, (ii) does not shift, (iii) shifts upward first and then downward, and (iv) shifts upward,
when R increases.14 Therefore, the “ECON ONLY” case predicts a possibly nonzero correlation
between credit card spending activity and voucher stocks. In Appendix 2.8.2, Figure 2.9 to 2.11
plot E[y|P,R,W = 1], E[y|P,R,W = 2], and E[y|P,R,W = 3]. They appear qualitatively similar
to Figure 2.3.
B. The Psychological Mechanism Rationalizes the “Residual” Behavior That Is Unex-
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Panel 2: ECON + PSYCH
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Figure 2.4: Predicted Week-0 Credit Card Spending (A Comparison Between ECON ONLY Case
and ECON+PSYCH Case)
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-0 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 0]), the x-axis depicts
the weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors)
correspond to different weekly initial voucher stocks (R). In the right panel (“ECON ONLY”
case), I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) and ci = 0. In the right panel (“ECON+PSYCH ONLY” case), I
set (δ0i, δ1i) = (3, 12 ) and ci = 0.
plained by the Economic Mechanism. Panel 1 of Figure 2.4 shows the “ECON ONLY” case,
the same as in Figure 2.3. Panel 2 of Figure 2.4 presents a “ECON+PSYCH” case where I keep the
14In the next section, I show that in my data, at the sample-population level, consumers decrease their weekly credit
card spending activity when their weekly initial voucher stock increases.
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presence of both mechanisms by setting ci = 0 and (δ0i, δ1i) = (3, 12 ). The “ECON ONLY” panel
shows that (1) the credit card spending curve (E[y|P,R,W = 0]) shifts downward when R increases,
and that (2) the curve is lower when P ≥ P̄ than when P < P̄ . The “ECON+PSYCH” panel,
on the other hand, “breaks this pattern”, as it shows that (1) the curve shifts downward when R
increases, but that (2) the curve is higher when P ≥ P̄ than when P < P̄ . This is because in the
“ECON+PSYCH” case, δ1i = 12 > 0, so the consumer has an increasing marginal value of goals. In
Appendix 2.8.2, Figure 2.13 to 2.15 plot E[y|P,R,W = 1], E[y|P,R,W = 2], and E[y|P,R,W = 3].
They appear qualitatively similar to Figure 2.4.
In the next section, I show that in my data, the pattern of credit card spending is similar to
the “ECON+PSYCH” panel presented here, so the economic mechanism alone cannot rationalize
such behavior, and the psychological mechanism would need to be there to rationalize the “residual”
behavior.
C. Summary. This section shows that (1) the economic mechanism uniquely predicts a possibly
nonzero probability of voucher redemption; (2) the economic mechanism uniquely predicts a possibly
nonzero correlation between the weekly credit card spending activity and the weekly initial voucher
stocks; (3) the psychological mechanism rationalizes the “residual” credit card spending behavior
that cannot be rationalized by the economic mechanism. (1) and (2) are the sources of variation that
jointly identify the parameters of the economic mechanism, and (3) is the source of variation that
identifies the parameters of the psychological mechanism. We have a hypothesis that we could test
for the presence of the psychological mechanism. If the psychological mechanism were missing, then:
If the weekly credit card spending activity is negatively correlated with the weekly initial voucher
stocks, the weekly credit card spending activity would be lower when the consumer is pursuing a
higher goal than when she is pursuing the lower goal.
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2.3 Data and Preliminary Analyses
In the previous section, I described the distinguishable credit card spending and voucher redemption
behaviors predicted by the economic and psychological mechanisms. I also presented a hypothesis for
testing the presence of the psychological mechanism. This section accomplishes this empirical task.
In Section 2.3.1, I describe the data sample for my empirical analysis. In Section 2.3.2, I present
the summary statistics related to consumer credit card spending and voucher redemption behaviors
and visualize the key facts in my data. In Section 2.3.3, I do hypothesis testing. In Section 2.3.4, I
check a few possible confounding factors to show that the hypothesis testing results are robust.
2.3.1 Data
I use the dataset from a European credit card loyalty program that is provided by the Wharton
Customer Analytics (WCA).15 My sample has 621 consumers who opened an account between 2010
and 2012 and who have earned at least one voucher during this period.16 For every cardholder,
the data have real-time records since the time when she opened the account, on her (1) credit
card transactions, (2) loyalty points earning activity, (3) voucher earning activity, and (4) voucher
redemption activity.
Based on the information, I construct the weekly-level variables for my empirical analyses.17 For
each consumer, and during each week, I observe:
(1) the week index within the current billing cycle;
(2) the total credit card spending she made;
(3) the credit card spending she made respectively in the three types of stores that differ in the
15Here is the link to an introductory description of the dataset: https://wcai.wharton.upenn.edu/research/anal
ysis-of-coalition-loyalty-programs/.
16I rely on the variation in credit card spending activity as the voucher stock varies to identify the parameters of
the economic mechanism.
17In my case, the assumption that cardholders decide on the amount of credit card spending on a weekly basis seems
more reasonable than the one that involves a more granular basis, because in my data, cardholders used the credit
card on a fairly infrequent basis, roughly once every two weeks. I show later that working with this dataset either at
the daily level or at the weekly level do not affect the conclusions I draw from my preliminary analyses. However, this
is not a general phenomenon. I refer interested readers to Kim et al. (2019) for a study on the effect of the granularity
of data on the empirical results one could obtain, in the case of using Nielsen Homescan data.
66
points issuance ratios: “1 point per $5 spent using the credit card” (the non-network stores, i.e.,
the stores that are out of the program’s network), “1 point per $2 spent using the credit card” (the
less generous network stores), and “1 point per $1 spent using the credit card” (the more generous
network stores);
(4) the total points she earned;
(5) the points she earned respectively in the above three types of stores;
(6) the number of vouchers she earned;
(7) the number of vouchers she redeemed;
(8) her initial points stock; and
(9) her initial voucher stock.18
The complete dataset includes consumers who opened an account between 2002 and 2012. In this
study, I focus on consumers who opened an account between 2010 and 2012. This study aims to use
a dynamic model to analyze the stationary patterns of consumer credit card spending and voucher
redemption behaviors. The data before 2010 are not suitable for this purpose due to the massive
changes that happened to the program during the pre-2010 period: (1) Storm et al. (2017) find
that the program experienced eight changes in points issuance ratios across 40 stores, respectively
on January 5th, 2007, January 25th, 2007, February 1st, 2007, September 30th, 2008, September
1st, 2009, October 7th, 2009, November 20th, 2009, and December 7th, 2009;19 (2) On September
1st, 2009, the program went through a massive change that involves (a) program-wise changes in
the points issuance ratios; (b) a change in the voucher face value; (c) a change in the cap on the
resulting discount rate from voucher redemption; and (d) a change in the frequency at which the
program converts loyalty points into vouchers. While I do not use the pre-2010 data for my primary
18The raw data do not directly provide information on the variables (8) and (9). I construct the two variables
from variables (1) to (7). I validate the two constructed variables by checking whether the observed weekly number
of vouchers the company generated has any contradiction with the constructed weekly initially points stock and the
observed weekly points consumers earn. I find that the observed variables and the constructed variables are in perfect
sync with each other.
19Stourm et al. (2017) focus on the period between 2006 and 2012 when there is sufficient variation in (1) points
issuance ratios, and (2) the choice of stores, to study the factors that impact consumers’ choice of shopping at the
network stores over shopping at the non-network stores. They also find that after 2010, there was only one store
that changed its points issuance ratio, on April 5th, 2011. It is an unpopular store – out of the 621 consumers in my
sample, no one used this credit card at this store.
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analyses, I will leverage this part of the data and the program change on September 1st, 2009 to
validate the results of the counterfactual analyses I conduct in a later part of this chapter.
2.3.2 Summary Statistics and Key Facts
Table 2.3 summarizes credit card spending and voucher redemption activity during the sample
period (1) at the sample-population level, and (2) by whether the consumer is a redeemer. I refer to
a consumer as a redeemer if she redeemed vouchers by the end of the sample period (December 31st,
2012). Otherwise, she is a non-redeemer. It turns out that only 256 out of 621 (41%) consumers
are redeemers. A non-redeemer could have redeemed after the sample ends.20 The table shows
that (1) non-redeemers and redeemers have similar credit card spending in the non-network stores;
(2) non-redeemers made 70% fewer credit card transactions than redeemers in the network stores.
However, the sizes of the transactions are similar across the two groups. The above facts suggest that
non-redeemers tend to visit the network stores less frequently. This seems to be also consistent with
non-redeemers’ inactive redemption behavior, as vouchers can only be redeemed at select network
stores.
About 40% of the weeks have zero credit card spending. Consumers spent an average of
$325/week (and earned 65 points/week) in the non-network stores and $241/week (and earned 192
points/week) in the network stores when they did use the credit card. When voucher conversions
occurred, consumers had an average of 732 points in their account.
In terms of the redemption behavior, the table shows that (1) consumers earned an average of
6 vouchers in total during the sample period; (2) redeemers earned more vouchers (on average, 8)
than non-redeemers (on average, 4); (3) consumers earn an average of one voucher upon voucher
conversion; (4) redeemers tend to redeem vouchers in bulk, as they redeemed an average of 2.50
vouchers upon redemption, which is on average 83% of the voucher stock they had at the moment;
20However, I cannot observe this information. This is a primary reason why I cannot rely solely on the observed
redemption behavior to identify all the parameters of the economic mechanism. I also need to rely on the variation
in credit card spending activity as the voucher stock varies.
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Table 2.3: Summary of Credit Card Spending and Voucher Redemption Activity
Overall Redeemers Non-Redeemers
Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev
Number of Weekly Observations 621 80 31 256 88 29 365 75 32
Non-Network-Store Transactions 621 32 22 256 35 25 365 30 20
Network-Store Transactions 621 6 8 256 10 10 365 3 5
Average Spending in
Non-Network Stores (Dollars/Week) 606 325 189 246 320 200 360 328 182
Network Stores (Dollars/Week) 508 241 484 249 231 287 259 251 616
Average Points Upon Conversion 621 732 472 256 765 311 365 708 558
Vouchers Earned 621 6.0 7.3 256 8.4 8.3 365 4.2 5.9
Redemption Incidences 256 2.4 2.6
Number of Vouchers
Generated Upon Conversion 256 1.2 1.4
Redeemed Upon Redemption 256 2.5 2.2
Frequency of No Redemption 256 0.57 0.33
Note: (1) Non-Network-/Network-Store Transactions: The number of weeks when the consumer used the credit card in a
non-network-/network store. (2) Average Spending in Non-Network-/Network Stores: Conditional on using the credit card in a
non-network-/network store, the consumer’s average amount of the credit card spending. (3) Average Points Upon Conversion:
When the company converted the loyalty points into vouchers, the average number of points the consumer had in her account. (4)
Number of Vouchers Generated Upon Conversion: When the company converted the loyalty points into vouchers, the average
number of vouchers generated. (5) Number of Vouchers Redeemed Upon Redemption: When the consumer was redeeming
vouchers, the average number of vouchers she redeemed. (6) Frequency of No Redemption: The probability of a redeemer not
redeeming any vouchers even when she could (when she spent a positive amount at a network store that accepts vouchers, and
had vouchers in stock).
and (5) for roughly one out of two occasions, redeemers did not redeem any vouchers even when
they could (i.e. when they spent a positive amount at a network store that accepts vouchers and had
vouchers in stock). The above facts suggest that both redeemers and non-redeemers were stockpiling
vouchers. There might be multiple reasons why consumers may stockpile vouchers: (1) they do not
shop at the stores that accept vouchers; (2) they find vouchers not valuable due to stores’ pricing
and reward policies; (3) they find redemption inconvenient; and (4) they find bulk redemption more
valuable than redeeming the vouchers one by one. In the later part of this chapter, my structural
estimation results reveal heterogeneous consumers with different reasons for inactive redemption
behavior: Some consumers find vouchers not beneficial (i.e., have small values of b̄); the others find
redemption inconvenient (i.e., have large values of c).
Figure 2.5 shows how credit card spending activity varies as a consumer’s weekly initial points
stock varies.21 It shows that, regardless of whether a consumer is a redeemer, (1) when the con-
21When plotting Figure 2.5, I control for individual heterogeneity in credit card spending activity by using each
consumer’s normalized weekly loyalty points earned. For each consumer, I normalize the weekly points she earned
by dividing the weekly points she earned over her average weekly points earned. This way, the plot shows the
within-individual dynamics of credit card spending activity as the weekly initial points stock varies.
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Figure 2.5: The Variation of Weekly Credit Card Spending Activity as the Weekly Initial Points
Stock Varies
Note: The vertical axis uses the normalized weekly loyalty points earned. The horizontal axis
represents the weekly initial points stock.
sumer’s points stock is between 0 and 500, she increases her credit card spending activity as she
advances towards the threshold of 500 points. This is a sign that she cares about passing the thresh-
old; (2) the consumer has higher credit card spending activity when her points stock is at least 500
than when it is between 0 and 500. This is a sign that she values passing the threshold of 1,000
points more than passing the threshold of 500 points.
Figure 2.6: The Variation of Weekly Credit Card Spending Activity Varies as the Weekly Initial
Voucher Stock Varies
Note: The vertical axis uses the normalized weekly loyalty points earned. The horizontal axis
represents the weekly initial voucher stock levels (low, middle, high)
Figure 2.6 shows how credit card spending activity varies as a consumer’s weekly initial voucher
stock varies. Voucher stocks vary considerably across consumers, so I use the normalized weekly
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initial voucher stock: low, middle, high.22 The figure shows that regardless of whether the consumer
is a redeemer, her credit card spending activity is negatively correlated with her weekly initial
voucher stocks.
2.3.3 Hypothesis Testing
We have a hypothesis that we could test for the presence of the psychological mechanism. If the psy-
chological mechanism were missing, then: if her credit card spending activity is negatively correlated
with her weekly initial voucher stocks, her credit card spending activity would be lower when she




Y ∗it if Y ∗it ≥ 0
0 if Y ∗it < 0
where
Y ∗it = β1P̄it + β2R̄it + β3Dit + β
′
4Wit + λi + εit
Here the variable Yit is the number of points consumer i earned during week t. The variable Y ∗it is
the latent value of Yit. The variable P̄it is the distance between i’s weekly initial points stock and
the next threshold. For example, if her weekly initial points stock is 300, the next threshold is 500
points, then P̄it = 200. If her weekly initial points stock is 700, the next threshold is 1,000 points,
then P̄it = 300. The variable R̄it a continuous version of i’s normalized weekly initial voucher stock.
It can take any value between 0 and 1. The binary variable Dit indicates whether i’s weekly initial
points stock is at least 500. The 4× 1 vector Wit indicates the week index within the current billing
22I calculate the continuous version of the normalized weekly initial voucher stock as the consumer’s weekly initial
voucher stock divided by the highest weekly initial voucher stock ever observed of that consumer. For example, if a
consumer currently has 4 vouchers in stock, and during the sample period, she has held up to 6 vouchers in stock,
then her normalized weekly initial voucher stock for the current week is 2/3. The discretized version of the normalized
weekly initial voucher stock is low, middle, high, when the continuous normalized weekly initial voucher stock is
between 0 and 1/3, between 1/3 and 2/3, and between 2/3 and 1.
23Tobit Models suit well the setting where the dependent variable (1) is continuous or has many discrete values,
(2) lower bounded at 0, and (3) has many zeros. In my case, the dependent variable is the loyalty points a consumer
earns during a week, which is continuous, nonnegative, and has 63% of the values 0. Therefore, I use the Tobit Model
for this analysis. For similar examples, I refer interested readers to Wang et al. (2016) where the authors use Tobit
models to analyze consumers’ decisions on how many hotel nights to purchase monthly.
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cycle. The variable λi is the individual-level random effect. The variable εit is a normally distributed
error that is typically assumed in Tobit Models.
Table 2.4: Random-Effects Tobit Model Estimates.
Weekly Daily
Y : Points Earned Main Robust (A) Robust (B) Main Robust (A) Robust (B)
β1: Distance to Thresholds −2.5666∗ −3.1117∗∗ −4.4250∗∗ −3.1817∗∗∗ −3.5467∗∗∗ −4.4086∗∗∗
(1.0267) (1.0371) (1.0442) (0.4886) (0.4928) (0.4985)
β2: Voucher Stock Level −19.5728∗∗∗ −17.7197∗∗∗ −10.9224∗∗∗ −10.1838∗∗∗ −9.0187∗∗∗ −5.3123∗∗∗
(2.9399) (2.9821) (3.0550) (1.3986) (1.4137) (1.4492)
β3: Passed 500 Points (Yes) 14.5097∗∗∗ 15.5812∗∗∗ 23.5171∗∗∗ 19.6167∗∗∗ 20.6431∗∗∗ 25.1854∗∗∗
(3.4402) (3.4519) (3.5380) (1.3933) (1.4054) (1.4611)
Time Trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Credit Card Balance No No Yes No No Yes
Obs 50,552 50,552 50,552 386,703 386,703 386,703
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Robust (A) checks whether consumer learning and natural attrition matter; Robust (B) checks whether credit
card balance matters.
The panel Main, Weekly of Table 2.4 shows the results. It shows that (1) consumers increase their
credit card spending activity as they advance towards the next threshold (β̂1 = −2.56, p = 0.012);
(2) consumers’ credit card spending activity is negatively correlated with their weekly initial voucher
stocks (β̂2 = −19.57, p < 0.001); and (3) their credit card spending activity is higher when their
weekly initial points stock is at least 500 than when it is between 0 and 500 (β̂3 = 14.50, p < 0.001).
The combination of (2) and (3) reject the null hypothesis about the absence of the psychological
mechanism – it shows that while credit card spending activity is negatively correlated with voucher
stocks, it increases as consumers are pursuing a higher goal.
The panel Main, Daily of Table 2.4 shows the results using the daily-level data for a robustness
check. The results from the daily analysis are qualitatively similar to the weekly analysis.
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2.3.4 Confounding Factors, Robustness Checks, and the Stationarity of
the Detected Patterns
I check the following confounding factors that may impact my reduced-form results: (1) consumer
learning and natural attrition that may change consumers’ credit card spending activity over time;
and (2) the variation in credit card balance that put a restraint on consumers’ ability to spend
with the credit card. To check (1), I add a linear time trend to the main regression model; Panel
Robust (A) of Table 2.4 shows the results. To check (2), I further add a variable weekly initial credit
card balance to the regression model; Panel Robust (B) of Table 2.4 shows the results. Comparisons
between Panel Robust (A) and Panel Main, and between Panel Robust (B) and Panel Main show that
the coefficients on the variables of interest have the same sign and statistical significance regardless
of (1) whether I control for the time trend that captures the influence of consumer learning and
natural attrition, and (2) whether I control for consumers’ credit card balance.
In Section 2.2, Figure 2.3 and 2.4 also predict that (1) the increases in a consumer’s credit card
spending activity as she advances towards the next threshold, and (2) the increases in her spending
activity as she pursues a higher goal, are persistent when her voucher stock varies. To check whether
the two properties hold in my data, I estimate the following Random-Effects Tobit Model:
Yit =

Y ∗it if Y ∗it ≥ 0
0 if Y ∗it < 0
where






3Wit + λi + εit
Here Xit is a 3 × 1 vector of variables that indicate the distance between i’s weekly initial points
stock and the next threshold when the voucher stock levels are respectively low, middle, and high;
and Zit is a 5× 1 vector of binary variables that can indicate the following six statuses:
(a) The voucher stock level is low, and the points stock is between 0 and 500 (Benchmark);
(b) The voucher stock level is low, and the points stock is at least 500.
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(c) The voucher stock level is middle, and the points stock is between 0 and 500;
(d) The voucher stock level is middle, and the points stock is at least 500.
(e) The voucher stock level is high, and the points stock is between 0 and 500;
(f) The voucher stock level is high, and the points stock is at least 500;
Table 2.5 shows the results. The results show that (1) regardless of their voucher stock levels,
consumers increase their spending activity as they get closer to the next threshold (β̂21 = −1.71,
p= 0.292; β̂22 = −3.09, p= 0.097; β̂23 = −3.52, p= 0.059); and (2) regardless of their voucher
stock levels, consumers increase their spending activity as they pursue a higher goal (β̂31 = 5.33;
β̂33 = 23.50 vs. β̂32 = −1.16; and β̂35 = 5.12 vs. β̂34 = −15.47).24 The results from the daily
analysis are qualitatively similar to the weekly analysis.
Table 2.5: Random-Effects Tobit Model Estimates: Checking the Pattern Stationarity
Weekly Daily
Y : Points Earned
β21: Distance × −1.7196 −2.9429∗∗∗
Low Voucher Stock (1.6304) (0.7591)
β22: Distance × −3.0975 −2.8384∗∗
Middle Voucher Stock (1.8653) (0.8965)
β23: Distance × −3.5249 −3.8235∗∗∗
High Voucher Stock (1.8677) (0.9032)
β31: Low Voucher Stock × 5.3362 17.5167∗∗∗
Passed 500 Points (Yes) (4.9262) (1.9914)
β32: Middle Voucher Stock × −1.1672 0.7853
Passed 500 Points (No) (2.6358) (1.2830)
β33: Middle Voucher Stock × 23.5014∗∗∗ 19.2047∗∗∗
Passed 500 Points (Yes) (5.6983) (2.2924)
β34: High Voucher Stock × −15.4775∗∗∗ −8.1849∗∗∗
Passed 500 Points (No) (2.6220) (1.2734)
β35: High Voucher Stock 5.1226 17.9909∗∗∗
Passed 500 Points (Yes) (7.0615) (2.7096)
Obs. 50,552 386,703
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
24Here, the statistical significance of the estimates is all relative to the benchmark – status (a). So I only report
the sizes of the estimates.
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2.4 Structural Model and Estimation
In this section, I develop a structural model and cast it in the discrete choice framework for estima-
tion. In Section 2.4.1, I write down the structural model. In 2.4.2, I describe how I discretize and
operationalize the variables to estimate the discrete choice model. In Section 2.4.3, I present the
econometric specification, construct the log-likelihood function, and describe the estimation method.
In Section 2.4.4, I discuss identification.
2.4.1 Structural Model
Let yjt denote the amount of credit card spending in Store j. Store j = 1, 2, 3 respectively refer
to the non-network stores, the less generous network stores, and the more generous network stores.
The three types of stores have points issuance ratios respectively 0.2 points/dollar, 0.5 points/dollar,
and 1.0 points/dollar. Let r̄j denote the points issuance ratio in Store j. The utility function is
given by:
U(Pt, Rt, y1t, . . . , yJt, nt, εt|θi)




















 ψi [(nt + γi)αi − γαii ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
b̄i: Utility from Price Discount
− ci · 1[nt > 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
c̄i: Redemption Cost
︸ ︷︷ ︸




























Weekly Initial Value of Points
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u2i: Utility From the Psychological Mechanism




where Ū(Pt, Rt, y1t, . . . , yJt, nt|θi) is the mean utility, and εt|y1t,...,yJt,nt is the utility shock, asso-
ciated with choosing (y1t, . . . , yJt, nt). The notation J ≡ 3 is the number of types of stores. The
transition of the state variables Ωt = (Pt, Rt,Wt) is the same as in the theoretical model, except
that the change in Pt is now given by
∑J
j=1 r̄jyjt, as consumers earn points from each of the J types
of stores.
2.4.2 Discrete Choice Framework, Variable Operationalization, and Vari-
able Discretization
To estimate the structural model, I cast the model in a discrete choice framework. Below describes
how I operationalize and discretize the variables for estimating the discrete choice model.
A. Decision Variables: Credit Card Spending and the Number of Vouchers Redeemed.
Theoretically, a consumer can choose credit card spending independently across Store 1, 2, and 3.
However, if she chooses among 0, 100, 200, . . . , 1, 000, 1000+︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 discrete choices
for each store type, then she will have
12× 12× 12 = 1728 possible choices of credit card spending. For computational feasibility, I assume
that consumers choose a single value of j each time. This way, they have up to 11 × 3 + 1 = 34
choices of credit card spending. For 8% of the weekly observations that involve more than one values
of j, I assume the consumer only visited Store j∗ where she earned the most loyalty points during
that week.
Let Dt ≡ (jt, kt, nt) = (j, k, n) denote a vector of discrete decisions on (1) the Store, (2) the
amount of spending, and (3) the number of vouchers to redeem. The index j can take values 0,
1, 2, and 3, respectively referring to no credit card spending, Store 1, 2, and 3. The index k can
take values 0, . . . , K. In what follows, I will explain how I map the observed amounts of credit
card spending to the discrete values of k. The index n can take values 0, . . . , Rt, where Rt is the
consumer’s weekly initial voucher stock in week t.






: If the consumer chose an amount between 0 and $100, then kt = 100; if the consumer
chose an amount between $100 and $200, then kt = 200, etc. If the consumer chose an amount above
$1,000, I cap the value of Kt at K ≡ 1100, as only about 6% of the observations involve more than
$1,000 of credit card spending.25 If Rt = 10, then the vector Dt can take 34 × 11 = 374 possible
values.
B. State Variables: The Weekly Initial Points Stock, the Weekly Initial Voucher Stock,
and the Week Index Within the Billing Cycle. Given the discretized spending, consumers
also earn points of discrete sizes. In Store 1, the sizes of the points earned are 0, 20, 40, etc., given
that the points issuance ratio in Store 1 is 0.2. In Store 2, the sizes are 0, 50, 100, etc., given that
the points issuance ratio in Store 2 is 0.5. In Store 3, the sizes are 0, 100, 200, etc, given that the
points issuance ratio in Store 3 is 1.0. Given the discretized points earned, I discretize the weekly




: If the points stock is between 0 and 10, then
Pt = 0; if the points stock is between 10 and 20, then Pt = 10, etc. If the points stock is more than
2,000, I cap the value at Pmax ≡ 2000.26 I cap the weekly initial voucher stock at Rmax ≡ 10.27
Every billing cycle has four weeks (T̄ = 3) so the week index Wt ∈
{
0, 1, 2, 3
}
. Let Ωt = (Pt, Rt,Wt)
denote the vector of state variables. Ultimately, it can take 201× 11× 4 = 8844 possible values.
2.4.3 Econometric Specification, Log-Likelihood Function, and Estima-
tion Method
Let d denote a discrete choice. It corresponds to a certain decision vector D = (j, k, n) and corre-
spondingly, a certain value of the vector (y1, . . . , yJ , n).
25The average encoded value is $299, and the average weekly credit card spending in my data is $294. The closeness
between the two average values suggests that the degree of the chosen coarseness of the grid points (with the grid
size $100) is reasonable. However, the discretization does shrink the distribution of the values of the weekly credit
card spending: The 10th percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 75th percentile and 90th percentile of the values
of the weekly credit card spending are respectively $57, $146, $337, $502, and $700, while these percentiles of the
encoded values are respectively $100, $200, $400, $500, and $700. I expect that this should have little impact on my
empirical analyses, because a $50 difference in the amount of credit card spending in Store 1 (which has the points
issuance ratio 0.2) only leads to a difference in the earned loyalty points of 10, and 87% of the credit card transactions
in my data occurred in Store 1.
26In the data, only 0.02% of the observations have the weekly initial points stock higher than 2,000.
27In the data, only 2% of the observations have the weekly initial voucher stock higher than 10.
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A. Econometric Specification. The discrete choice model takes the following form:
U(Ω, d, ε|θi) = Ū(Ω, d|θi) + εjkn (2.4.2)
Here, U(Ω, d, ε|θi) ≡ U(Ω, y1, . . . , yJ , n|θi), Ū(Ω, d|θi) ≡ Ū(Ω, y1, . . . , yJ , n|θi), and εjkn is the utility
shock associated with D = (j, k, n), which is assumed to be a Type-I extreme value.
B. Latent Class Framework and Bellman Equations. To account for individual heterogeneity,
I assume there are S types of consumers. Type s ∈
{
1, . . . , S
}
occurs with probability πs such that∑S
s=1 πs = 1. If a consumer is Type s, her parameters are θs, and she solves the following Bellman
Equation:
V (Ω, ε|θs) = max
d
{U(Ω, d, ε|θs) + βsEV (Ω′|Ω, d, θs)} . (2.4.3)
where Ω = (P,R,W ) and Ω′ = (P ′, R′,W ′) are respectively the current-week and the next-week
state variables. The functions V (Ω, ε|θs) and EV (Ω′|Ω, d, θs) are respectively the value function and
the expected value function conditional on Ω and d.
C. Choice Probability. Solving the Bellman Equation will yield EV (Ω′|Ω, d, θs). Conditional on








Ū(Ω, d′|θs) + βsEV (Ω′|Ω, d′, θs)
] (2.4.4)














Here dit is consumer i’s observed choice during week t. The vector Ωit is i’s vector of state variables
in period t. Ti is the number of observations of consumer i. Θ is the parameter space, Ω is the set
of the observed states, and D is the set of the observed choices, of all consumers in the data.
E. Estimation. I estimate the model using the Nested-Fixed-Point (NFXP) Algorithm from Rust
(1994). The algorithm has an inner loop and an outer loop. In the inner loop, given Θ, the
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algorithm solves for EV (·|·, ·, θs), for s = 1, . . . , S, using the fixed point iteration algorithm, and
computes the log-likelihood of the data, L(Θ|Ω,D). In the outer loop, the algorithm searches
for the parameters Θ∗ that maximize L(Θ|Ω,D). I use the gradient-based maximum likelihood
estimation method Berndt–Hall–Hall–Hausman (BHHH) Algorithm (Train 2009) in the outer loop.
The BHHH Algorithm requires the gradient to exist, so I set γ’s to be 1 to ensure that L′ exists at
nt = 0. Through trial estimation, I find that parameters of the opportunity cost term, (φjs, ηjs), are
not empirically jointly identified. The searching algorithm jumps around with large φjs and small
ηjs, or small φjs and large ηjs with no clear sign of convergence, so I set η’s to be 1.28
2.4.4 Identification
The identification argument is composed of four parts: (1) The variation in credit card spending
activity across weekly initial voucher stocks and the information on redemption behavior, including
(a) the redemption frequency, and (b) the total share of vouchers redeemed, jointly identify the
economic mechanism; (2) the “residual” variation in credit card spending activity across weekly
initial points stocks that cannot be rationalized by the identified economic mechanism identifies the
psychological mechanism; (3) the average credit card spending activity identifies the opportunity
cost parameters; and (4) the magnitude of the peak, and the curvature, of the credit card spending
activity as a function of the weekly initial points stock, identify the discount factor. To see (4),
Figure 2.7 presents the Week-0 credit card spending curve as I vary the value of discount factor
βi = 0.95, 0.50, 0. It shows that (1) the maximal credit card spending activity when βi = 0 is three
times higher than that when βi = 0.95, and (2) the variation in credit card spending activity as the
weekly initial points stock varies looks more abrupt when βi increases.
To confirm that the structural model is empirically identifiable, Appendix 2.8.3 conducts a pa-
rameter recovery exercise. I assign values to the model parameters and simulate datasets. Then,
28While theoretically, one can identify the curvature of the opportunity cost function, Kim et al. (2002) show that
it is empirically challenging to separately identify any nonlinear curvature of a utility function and its scale when the
observed purchasing incidences are sparse. My case echoes with this, where 54% of the weekly observations have zero
credit card spending.
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Figure 2.7: Predicted Week-0 Credit Card Spending with Different Discount Factors
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-0 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 0]), the x-axis depicts
weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors) correspond
to different values of weekly initial voucher stock (R). Across the three panels, I set
(δ0i, δ1i) = (3,
1
2 ), ci = 15, and βi to be respectively 0.95, 0.50, and 0.
I estimate the model using the simulated datasets. Table 2.12 shows the result from a randomly
simulated dataset. The results show that every parameter value is covered by the 95% confidence
interval of the estimate,29 which suggests that the estimation method can accurately recover the
true parameters.
2.5 Estimation Results
In this section, I present the estimation results. In Section 2.5.1, I assess the model performance in
the statistical fit: the log-likelihood (LL), AIC, and BIC, and how the model fits (1) the average
behavior, (2) the individual behavior, and (3) the dynamic behavior. I find that the models with
more types outperform the models with fewer types mainly in fitting the individual behavior. I
also show that in the absolute sense, the model fit performance is satisfactory as determined by the
confidence-interval coverage. In Section 2.5.2, I show the estimates of the Four-Latent-Class model
and discuss the implications of the estimates.
29Here the 95% confidence interval is calculated as [µ̄− 1.96σ̂, µ̄+1.96σ̂], where µ̄ is the estimate of the parameter,
and σ̂ is the standard error of the estimate. Similar to the formal estimation, the standard errors are obtained from
the inverted Hessian matrix of the likelihood function that is evaluated at the model estimates.
80
2.5.1 Model Fit
I assess how the model performs in terms of the following measures:
A. Log-Likelihood, AIC, BIC. The panel Statistical Fit of Table 2.6 shows the values of LL,
AIC, and BIC. The Four-Latent-Class model outperforms the homogeneous, the Two-Latent-Class,
and the Three-Latent-Class models as it generates higher LL, lower AIC, and lower BIC.30
B. Average Behavior. The panel Average Behavior of Table 2.6 presents the predicted weekly
Table 2.6: Model Fit in Generating Behavioral Patterns
Data One-Class Two-Class Three-Class Four-Class
Statistical Fit
Log-Likelihood −98,661 −94,837 −92,985 −92,448
AIC 197,342 189,715 186,030 184,976
BIC 197,431 189,891 186,294 185,329
Average Behavior
Weekly Spending (Store 1) 116.0 115.4 115.5 115.4 115.4
[108.6, 121.0] [108.3, 121.4] [108.2, 122.0] [107.3, 122.4]
Weekly Spending (Store 2) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
[3.1, 3.9] [2.9, 3.9] [2.8, 4.0] [2.7, 4.0]
Weekly Spending (Store 3) 10.8 10.0 10.3 10.4 10.4
[9.6, 10.5] [9.5, 10.7] [9.7, 10.9] [9.7, 11.0]
Redemption Frequency 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016
[0.014, 0.018] [0.013, 0.018] [0.013, 0.018] [0.013, 0.018]
Proportion Redeemed 0.389 0.384 0.400 0.400 0.395
[0.377, 0.392] [0.390, 0.411] [0.388, 0.415] [0.379, 0.400]
Individual Behavior
Weekly Spending (Store 1) 0.41 0.53 0.61 0.68
Weekly Spending (Store 2) 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.79
Weekly Spending (Store 3) 0.45 0.52 0.73 0.72
Redemption Frequency 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.88
Proportion Redeemed 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.80
Note: (1) In the Average Behavior panel, below the average values are the 95% confidence intervals
calculated from the 10,000 simulated values. (2) In the Individual Behavior panel, the values
presented in the table are hit rates, i.e., the proportions of consumers the model fits well. The
model fits a consumer well if the consumer’s observed value is covered by the 95% confidence
interval of her 10,000 simulated values.
credit card spending in (1) Store 1, 2, and 3, (2) the redemption frequency, and (3) the share of
vouchers redeemed, of an average consumer, based on 10,000 simulated samples using the estimated
30Here I only show the results of models with up to four latent classes. For the Five-Latent-Class model, the standard
errors of the parameters of the economic mechanisms are unrealistically large. This happens when the variation in
the data is not rich enough to separately identify these many types of consumers through a frequentist approach.
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models.31 It shows that the Four-Latent-Class model performs slightly better than the less complex
models. In the absolute sense, for the Four-Latent-Class model, the observed value of each variable
is covered by the 95% confidence interval of the 10,000 simulated values.
C. Individual Behavior. The panel Individual Behavior of Table 2.6 presents the proportion
of consumers whose behavior the model fits well (the hit rate). For each variable, the model fits a
consumer’s behavior well if her observed value is covered by the 95% confidence interval of her 10,000
simulated values. The table shows that the Four-Latent-Class model generates hit rates higher than
the less complex models. Overall, the Four-Latent-Class model has hit rates that range from 0.68 to
0.88 across the five variables of interest, which are comparable to those reported in the past studies,
0.40 to 0.65 in Sunada (2019), and 0.52 to 0.80 in Chapter 1.
D. Dynamic Behavior. Figure 2.8 shows 10,000 simulated relationships between the credit card
spending activity and the weekly initial points stock vs. the observed relationship. The simulated
pattern closely matches the observed pattern in two major aspects: (1) the credit card spending
activity increases as consumers advance advance towards the next threshold; (2) the credit card
spending activity increases as consumers are pursuing a higher goal.
2.5.2 Model Estimates and Their Implications
Table 2.16 in Appendix 2.8.4 shows the model estimates of the Four-Latent-Class model. Table 2.7
interprets the model estimates in the following ways:
(1) Consumers belong to three tiers of credit card usage intensity: Light (Type III, with the
latent class probability 0.19, and with the simulated credit card spending being $53/week), Moderate
31When simulating the data samples using the models with more than one types, I need to simulate each consumer’s
type. I simulate a consumer’s type from her posterior type distribution. For consumer i, the posterior probability of















t=1 Prob(Dt|Ωt, θs) is i’s likelihood contribution if she is Type s, and the denominator is i’s unconditional
likelihood contribution. Here π̂s is the estimated latent class probability of Type s. I use the individual-level posterior
type distributions for (1) the other model fit analyses and (2) the counterfactual experiments.
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Figure 2.8: Model Fit of the Credit Card Spending Dynamics
Note: This plot is based on 10,000 simulated samples. It presents the relationship between
the weekly credit card spending activity against the weekly initial points stock.
Table 2.7: The Implications of the Four-Latent-Class Model Estimates
Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Latent Class Probability 0.49 0.29 0.19 0.02
Discount Factor 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.89
Economic Mechanism
Mean Benefit from Redeeming One Voucher −0.15 −0.29 0.33 1.25
Mean Redemption Cost (Disutility) 5.47 4.09 4.75 4.91
Simulated Redemption Rates 19% 52% 40% 85%
Psychological Mechanism
Mean Utility from Hitting 500 Points 1.91 0.79 −0.15 2.36
Mean Utility from Hitting 1,000 Points 3.91 2.04 1.84 3.14
Simulated Weekly Spending $104 $234 $53 $112
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(Type I and IV, with the sum of the latent class probabilities 0.52, and with the simulated credit card
spending being $104/week and $112/week), and Heavy (Type II, with the latent class probability
0.29, and with the simulated credit card spending $234/week).
(2) Consumers overall do not find vouchers very valuable for two reasons: (1) the benefit of
the resulting discount is small, and (2) the redemption cost is substantial. However, people value
vouchers heterogeneously, as the simulated shares of vouchers redeemed range from 0.19 to 0.85
across the four types.
(3) Consumers receive substantial satisfaction from goal achievement, and in particular, re-
ceive higher satisfaction from reaching a higher goal (i.e., the threshold of 1,000 points). Re-






, where Gt and Ḡt are respectively the weekly initial and weekly final
numbers of goals achieved during week t. For Type I, for example, u21(0, 1) = δ̂01 + δ̂11 ≈ 2,
and u21(1, 2) = δ̂10 + 3δ̂11 ≈ 4, so Type I consumers find hitting the threshold of 1,000 points
twice as attractive as just hitting the lower one. For Type III, u23(0, 1) = δ̂03 + δ̂13 ≈ 0 and
u23(1, 2) = δ̂03 +3δ̂13 ≈ 2 so Type III consumers find hitting the first goal not attractive but attach
great value to hitting the higher one. Overall, the results explain why consumers use the credit card
more intensely after their weekly initial points stock has reached 500 points.32
2.6 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section, using the model estimates, I address two major questions: (1) Is the current loyalty
program effective in increasing cardholders’ credit card spending? How effective is it? What is the
relative effectiveness of the economic and psychological mechanisms? (Section 2.6.1) (2) How can we
32The fundamental reasons why consumers would (1) feel satisfied from reaching goals and (2) find reaching a higher
goal more satisfactory than a lower goal – that are orthogonal to any direct financial motive – remain unclear in this
study. There are two conjectures that researchers could look into: (1) brand identity: Consumers love the brand, so
by establishing this goal framework, the brand “brainwashes” consumers into feeling recognized when they achieve a
higher goal; (2) persistent bias: Consumers consistently and mistakenly feel they would get more benefit by simply
reaching the higher goal even though they may end up not using vouchers at all. The latter reason typically exists in
the insurance, lottery, and financial markets, where agents consistently overestimate the benefits of certain insurance
plans, the probability of winning the lottery, and the returns of risky portfolio choices. I refer interested readers to
Barberis (2013) for a great literature review on these related studies.
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improve the current program to enhance profits for the credit card company, meanwhile enhancing
cardholders’ welfare? (Section 2.6.2)
To calculate the revenues for the credit card company, I assume that they come from two sources:
(1) the credit card processing fees paid by merchants when consumers use the credit card at these
merchants, and (2) the interest and late fees paid by cardholders. The interest occurs when card-
holders only pay a partial amount of the balance; the late fees occur when they fail to pay on time
or pay the minimum amount due.
To calculate the credit card processing fees, I assume that the credit card company charges the
merchants with 2.50% of the transaction amount, which is the average credit card processing rate
of credit cards.33
To calculate the interest and late fees, I assume that each consumer incurs a fixed ratio of her
paid interest and late fees to her total credit card spending.34 I calculate this ratio for each consumer
as her observed total interest and late fees divided by her observed total credit card spending. This
ratio is, on average, 1.60%.
To calculate the cost faced by the credit card company, I use the institutional fact that the
company pays a merchant 90% of the voucher values when consumers redeem the vouchers at the
merchant. I refer to this cost as the redemption coverage cost.








R2: Interest and Late Fees
− κ̄R̄ni︸ ︷︷ ︸
C: Redemption Coverage Cost
}
where w̄ = 0.025 is the processing rate, Yi is consumer i’s total credit card spending, σi is consumers
i’s ratio of her interest and late fees to her total credit card spending, ni is the total number of
33The processing rates range from 1.50% to 3.50%: https://www.creditdonkey.com/credit-card-processing-fe
es.html
34I impose this assumption to avoid modeling endogenous credit card repayment decisions for the model’s compu-
tational feasibility. Several facts in my data suggest that the occurrence and the amount of interest and late fees may
arise not out of cardholders’ strategic planning: In my data sample, 44% of the cardholders never paid late or had
overdue balance; 49% of the cardholders show the following repayment patterns: (1) they repaid the full amount of
the balance a few days after missing the deadline and getting charged with a late fee: this occurred mostly likely due
to forgetting; (2) they repaid a fixed amount every month (except for zero or very low balance, in which case they
repaid a zero amount or an amount that is near zero); and (3) they repaid a fixed proportion of their balance. For
these 93% of the cardholders, the occurrence and amount of interest and late fees seem to be exogenous, which partly
supports the assumption of their fixed ratios to their total credit card spending.
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vouchers redeemed by consumer i, R̄ = 5 is the current voucher face value (i.e., $5), and κ̄ = 0.90 is
the proportion of the voucher values covered by the program.
2.6.1 The Effectiveness of the Current Program in Increasing Credit Card
Spending and the Relative Effectiveness of Each Mechanism
To measure the effects of the loyalty program and of each mechanism, I simulate the following
scenarios, using the model estimates:
(1) The loyalty program is removed (referred to as No loyalty program scenario);
(2) Consumers would not redeem vouchers (Psychological Mechanism Only scenario);35
(3) Consumers do not receive satisfaction from goal achievement (Economic Mechanism Only
scenario);
(4) The loyalty program is present and consumers behave according to the model estimates
(Current scenario).
Table 2.8: The Effect of the Loyalty Program on Revenues and Profits.
No LP PSYCH Only ECON Only Current
Value Value %∆ Value %∆ Value %∆
Total Amount 61.77 64.91 +5.08 61.95 +0.29 65.31 +5.73
Total Processing Fees 1.54 1.62 +5.08 1.55 +0.29 1.63 +5.73
Total Interest/Penalty Fees 0.88 0.94 +5.08 0.89 +0.29 0.95 +5.73
Total Revenues 2.43 2.56 +5.08 2.44 +0.29 2.58 +5.73
Generated Vouchers (×104) 0 0 - 0.30 - 0.31 -
Redeemed Vouchers (×104) 0 0 - 0.11 - 0.12 -
Total Cost 0 0 - 0.05 - 0.06 -
Total Profit 2.43 2.56 +5.08 2.39 −1.72 2.53 +5.07
Note: (1) In the panel No LP, the loyalty program is removed; (2) In the panel PSYCH
Only, consumers would not redeem vouchers; (3) In the panel ECON Only, consumers
do not receive satisfaction from goal achievement; (4) In the panel Current, the loyalty
program is present and consumers behave according to the model estimates. (5) %∆ is
the percentage change in the value compared to that in the panel No LP. (6) All values
are multiple of 105. (7) I compute the results based on 10,000 simulated samples.
Comparing the Current scenario to the No loyalty program scenario, Table 2.8 shows that the
35Similar to Section 2.2, I suppress the redemption probability into 0 by setting the redemption cost to be sufficiently
large: ci → ∞.
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loyalty program increases the total credit card spending by 5.73% (also the total revenues) and
increases the profit for the credit card company by 5.08%. Comparisons between the Economic
Mechanism Only scenario and the No loyalty program scenario (+0.29% in credit card spending), and
between the Psychological Mechanism Only scenario and the No loyalty program (+5.08% in credit
card spending) reveal that the psychological mechanism accounts for 89% of the credit card spending
increase driven by the program. The economic mechanism is much less effective in incentivizing
consumers to increase their credit card spending because most of them find the benefit of the
resulting discount from voucher redemption small (b̄i < 0) and have large redemption costs (with
the estimates of the disutility ranging from 4.09 to 5.47 across the types).
2.6.2 An Improved Program Design That Generates Win-Win Outcomes
While the credit card company profits from consumers increasing their credit card spending and
paying more interest and late fees, consumers will be worse off if they incur disproportionately
higher interest and late fees compared with the values of the vouchers they redeem. Is there any
improved design where we can increase profits and enhance consumer welfare at the same time? I














Changes in Interest and Late Fees
Table 2.9 shows (∆Π,∆CS) under different alternative points issuance ratios and voucher face values
(R̄), where ∆Π is the change in profits and ∆CS is the change in consumer welfare, compared to
the Current scenario.
Table 2.9 shows that (1) increasing points issuance ratios alone would increase profits (∆Π > 0);
and (2) increasing the voucher face value alone would decrease profits (∆Π < 0). The first policy
change exploits both the economic and psychological mechanisms, while the second policy change
exploits only the economic mechanism. Because the psychological mechanism is very effective in
increasing credit card spending, the first policy change would increase profits. Because the economic
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mechanism is not effective in increasing credit card spending, under the second policy change, the
increase in the redemption coverage cost counteracts the revenue increase from higher credit card
spending, so the profit decreases.
Appendix 2.8.5 shows that consumers responded to a program change in a way that is similar
to the result of this counterfactual analysis. On September 1st, 2009, the program (1) doubled
the points issuance ratio offered by the non-network stores from 0.1 to 0.2, and (2) lowered the
voucher face value from $15 (per 500 points) to $5 (per 500 points). Using the data before and after
this program change, I find that (1) consumers increased spending in the non-network stores; (2)
decreased spending in the network stores; and (3) increased total spending using the credit card.
This validates what my counterfactual analysis shows: increasing points issuance ratios is the way to
leverage the effective psychological mechanism to stimulate credit card spending to increase profits.
Table 2.9 also shows that the company has to increase both points issuance ratios and voucher
face value to generate win-win outcomes (∆Π > 0, ∆CS > 0) because by increasing points issuance
ratios alone, consumers will be worse off. This happens because they incur disproportionately higher
interest and late fees compared with the values of vouchers they redeem.
Table 2.9: Simulated Changes in Profit and Consumer Welfare Under Different Combinations of
Changes in Points Issuance Ratios and Voucher Face Values
+0% +5% +10% +15% +20%
+$0 (0,0) (+0.01,−0.00) (+0.04,−0.01) (+0.08,−0.02) (+0.14,−0.03)
+$5 (−0.05,+0.06) (−0.05,+0.06) (−0.02,+0.06) (+0.01,+0.06) (+0.05,+0.06)
+$10 (−0.10,+0.11) (−0.10,+0.12) (−0.08,+0.13) (−0.06,+0.13) (−0.02,+0.15)
+$15 (−0.15,+0.17) (−0.15,+0.17) (−0.14,+0.19) (−0.12,+0.20) (−0.09,+0.23)
Note: (1) The first column lists the changes in the voucher face value compared to the
current value ($5). (2) The first row lists the changes in points issuance ratios, the value
“+X%” means multiplying the current points issuance ratios (offered by all stores) by
(1 +X%). (3) The first element in the presented 1× 2 vectors is ∆Π, which is the change
in the profit for the credit card company; the second element is ∆CS, which is the change
in consumer welfare. (5) All values are multiple of 105. (6) I compute the results based
on 10,000 simulated samples.
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Table 2.10: Simulated Changes in Profit and Consumer Welfare Under Different Combinations of
Changes in Points Issuance Ratios and Voucher Face Values (With ci = 0)
+0% +5% +10% +15% +20%
+$0 (+0.37,−0.07) (+0.40,−0.08) (+0.49,−0.09) (+0.67,−0.13) (+0.97,−0.18)
+$5 (+0.19,+0.13) (+0.22,+0.13) (+0.28,+0.15) (+0.43,+0.17) (+0.61,+0.23)
+$10 (+0.01,+0.33) (+0.03,+0.35) (+0.06,+0.41) (+0.15,+0.49) (+0.24,+0.65)
+$15 (−0.17,+0.54) (−0.17,+0.58) (−0.17,+0.67) (−0.13,+0.82) (−0.13,+1.07)
Note: (1) The first column lists the changes in the voucher face value compared to the
current value ($5). (2) The first row lists the changes in points issuance ratios, the value
“+X%” means multiplying the current points issuance ratios (offered by all stores) by
(1 +X%). (3) The first element in the presented 1× 2 vectors is ∆Π, which is the change
in the profit for the credit card company; the second element is ∆CS, which is the change
in consumer welfare. (5) All values are multiple of 105. (6) I compute the results based
on 10,000 simulated samples.
2.6.3 What Would Happen If We Could Eliminate the Redemption Cost
Incurred by Consumers?
If the company managed to eliminate the fixed redemption cost the consumers incur (for exam-
ple, by going paperless or by improving the facility, to make the redemption process seamless and
convenient), the mean utility from the economic mechanism would be much higher. As a result, con-
sumers will redeem vouchers more actively, and the effect of the economic mechanism on credit card
spending would become more significant. Table 2.10 shows (∆Π,∆CS) under different alternative
points issuance ratios and voucher face values, with the redemption cost set to zero. Comparisons
between Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 show that (1) the profits would increase if one can eliminate the
redemption cost; (2) increasing voucher face value alone is now able to generate win-win outcomes.
In contrast, increasing points issuance ratios alone cannot generate a win-win outcome. Therefore,
regardless of whether we could eliminate the redemption cost, it seems always necessary to increase
voucher face value if we want to generate win-win outcomes.
To summarize, this section shows that (1) with the presence of the estimated magnitude of
the redemption cost, increasing points issuance ratios alone would increase profits but decrease
consumer welfare, while increasing voucher face value alone would decrease profits but increase
consumer welfare. Therefore, we need to increase both points issuance ratios and voucher face
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value to generate win-win outcomes; (2) by eliminating the fixed redemption cost consumers incur,
increasing voucher face value alone can generate win-win outcomes.
2.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
It is puzzling that small price discounts offered by non-tiered loyalty programs can trigger any
massive purchasing incentive at all. However, the prevalence of such programs seems to suggest
they can. In this study, I find that a non-tiered European credit card loyalty program, which has
a linear reward structure — consumers get a fixed-valued voucher for every fixed number of loyalty
points, can generate about a 5% profit increase for the credit card company. However, the increase
in cardholders’ credit card spending driven by the loyalty program does not merely come from the
value of the resulting price discounts (the economic mechanism). Indeed, I find that the induced
incentive to more actively using the credit card mainly comes from a psychological mechanism in
which consumers earn points for the sake of goal achievement. In this psychological mechanism,
consumers use external reward thresholds as goals and receive satisfaction upon hitting them.
Detailed records on credit card transactions, loyalty points earning, voucher earning, and voucher
redemption generate innovative sources of variation in the data that allow me to distinguish between
the two mechanisms (the economic and psychological mechanisms). The economic mechanism, for
example, is identified by the redemption behavior and the variation in credit card spending activity
across weekly initial voucher stocks. The psychological mechanism, on the other hand, is identified
by the “residual behavior”, i.e., the portion of the variation in credit card spending activity across
weekly initial points stock that cannot be explained by the economic mechanism.
Through structural estimation and counterfactual experiments, I show that the current loyalty
program increases credit card spending by 5.7%. I also find that the psychological mechanism has a
significant effect because consumers greatly value goal achievement. As a result, 89% of the above
increase is driven by the psychological mechanism. In contrast, the economic mechanism has a
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small effect because redemption induces minimal financial benefit, meanwhile causing a substantial
redemption cost for consumers. In this case, for firms seeking to increase credit card spending and
profits through the non-tiered loyalty program, I show that points-related policies (for example,
increasing points issuance ratios) should be the way to go. In contrast, increasing voucher face value
would decrease profits.
The methodology proposed in this chapter is capable of sorting the economic mechanism and
psychological mechanism out. It applies to any similar datasets as long as the data provides the
required information and variations.
Future research should focus on exploring the sources of the psychological mechanism and whether
there is any interaction between the two mechanisms, and if so, the mechanism driving that inter-
action. It will be interesting to see whether there is any causal link between the two mechanisms
because it will provide further insight into how firms can optimally design their reward policies.
This chapter sorts out the two mechanisms but to the degree that they are assumed to be mutually
independent. One will need more detailed data, and a cleaner data setting (such as through the
laboratory experiments) will be required to answer the above questions.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Appendix I: Model Implementation in Section 2.2.4
I cast the model into a dynamic discrete choice framework and use the fixed-point iteration algorithm
to solve the model, the typical method for solving the infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice model.
Table 2.11 displays parameter and variable values fixed throughout the numeric exercise, including
the points issuance ratio (r̄ = 1), the points threshold (P̄ = 500), the maximal points stock allowed
Pmax = 2000, maximal voucher stock allowed Rmax = 10, the maximal weekly spending allowed
ymax = 1000; opportunity cost coefficients (scaling coefficient φ = −0.03, the intercept parameter
γ1i = 1, the curvature parameter ηi = 1), the discount factor (βi = 0.95), the benefit function (b̄i)
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parameters (scaling coefficient ψi = 5, the intercept parameter γ2i = 1, and the curvature parameter
αi = 0.50).36
In this discrete choice framework, a consumer’s vector of decisions can take the following possible
values:
D = (y, n) ∈
{




0, 1, 2, . . . , R
}
where ∆y is the grid size, and Rt is the consumer’s weekly initial voucher stock. The vector of state
variables can take the following possible values:
Ω = (P,R,W ) ∈ {0,∆P, . . . , Pmax} ×
{
0, 1, . . . , Rmax} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
where ∆P is the grid size.
For a given value of the vector of parameter θ, I solve the model using the fixed-points iteration
method, which yields the expected value function EV (Ω′|Ω, D, θ) for each Ω and D. Given the








Ū(D′|Ω, θ) + βEV (Ω′|Ω, D, θ)
]
where Ū(D|Ω, θi) is the mean utility associated with D. Given Prob(D|Ω, θ), the expected Week-t
credit card spending is given by E[y|P,R,W = t] =
∑
D′ yD′Prob(D
′|P,R,W = t, θ), where yD′
refers to the spending in choice D′.
Table 2.11: Setup Values for Model Implementation
Item Value Item Value
Parameter Variables
r̄ 1 ∆y 50
φi −0.03 ∆P 50
αi 0.50 ymax 1000
βi 0.95 Pmax 2000
γ1i 1 Rmax 10
γ2i 1
ψi 5
36The parameter values I choose throughout this exercise aim to make the visualized predictions look sharp. My
identification strategy for distinguishing between the two mechanisms is general and has nothing to do with any
specific shapes of the functions presented here.
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2.8.2 Appendix II: Supplemental Prediction Results in Section 2.4: For
Weeks 1, 2, and 3.
Figure 2.9 - 2.11 present the expected Week-j (j = 1, 2, 3) credit card spending predicted by the
economic mechanism alone. Figure 2.12 - 2.14 present the expected Week-j (j = 1, 2, 3) credit card
spending when both mechanisms are present. Figure 2.15 present the prediction of the expected
Week-0 credit card spending when only the psychological mechanism is present and when consumers
exhibit different marginal values of goals.
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Panel 2: ECON ONLY
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Figure 2.9: Predicted Week-1 Credit Card Spending (A Comparison Between PSYCH ONLY Case
and ECON ONLY Case)
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-1 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 1]), the x-axis depicts
weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors) correspond
to different values of weekly initial voucher stock (R). In the left panel (“PSYCH ONLY”
case), I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (3,− 12 ) and ci = 15). In the right panel (“ECON ONLY” case), I set
(δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) and ci = 0.
2.8.3 Appendix III: The Empirical Identifiability of the Model: Parame-
ter Recovery Exercise
To prove that the structural is empirically identifiable, I assign parameter values to the model and
generate a random dataset that has the same size of the actual data. Table 2.12 shows the estimates.
The results show that every true parameter value is covered by the 95% confidence interval of the
estimate (calculated using the estimate and the standard error), which suggests that the NFXP
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Panel 1: PSYCH ONLY
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Panel 2: ECON ONLY
Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=0
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Figure 2.10: Predicted Week-2 Credit Card Spending (A Comparison Between PSYCH ONLY
Case and ECON ONLY Case)
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-2 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 2]), the x-axis depicts
weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors) correspond
to different values of weekly initial voucher stock (R). In the left panel (“PSYCH ONLY”
case), I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (3,− 12 ) and ci = 15). In the right panel (“ECON ONLY” case), I set
(δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) and ci = 0.
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Panel 1: PSYCH ONLY
Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=0
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Panel 2: ECON ONLY
Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=0
Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=1
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Figure 2.11: Predicted Week-3 Credit Card Spending (A Comparison Between PSYCH ONLY
Case and ECON ONLY Case)
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-3 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 3]), the x-axis depicts
weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors) correspond
to different values of weekly initial voucher stock (R). In the left panel (“PSYCH ONLY”
case), I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (3,− 12 ) and ci = 15). In the right panel (“ECON ONLY” case), I set
(δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) and ci = 0.
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g Panel 2: Cost = 5.00
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g Panel 3: Cost = 10.00
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g Panel 4: Cost = 15.00
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Figure 2.12: Predicted Week-0 Credit Card Spending Given Different Magnitudes of Redemption
Cost ci (An Example of ECON ONLY Case)
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-0 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 3]), the x-axis depicts
weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors) correspond
to different values of weekly initial voucher stock (R). Across the four panels, I set
(δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) so they represent the “ECON ONLY” case. Across the four panels, I set ci to
be respectively 0, 5, 10, and 15.
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Panel 1: ECON ONLY
Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=0
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Panel 2: ECON + PSYCH
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Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=1
Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=2
Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=3
Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=4
Weekly Initial Voucher Stock=5
Figure 2.13: Predicted Week-1 Credit Card Spending (A Comparison Between ECON ONLY Case
and PSYCH+ECON Case)
Note: Note: The y-axis depicts Week-1 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 1]), the x-axis
depicts weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors)
correspond to different values of weekly initial voucher stock (R). In the left panel (“ECON
ONLY” case), I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) and ci = 0). In the right panel (“ECON+PSYCH” case),
I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (3, 12 ) and ci = 0.
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Panel 1: ECON ONLY
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Panel 2: ECON + PSYCH
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Figure 2.14: Predicted Week-2 Credit Card Spending (A Comparison Between ECON ONLY Case
and PSYCH+ECON Case)
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-2 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 2]), the x-axis depicts
weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors) correspond
to different values of weekly initial voucher stock (R). In the left panel (“ECON ONLY”
case), I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) and ci = 0). In the right panel (“ECON+PSYCH” case), I set
(δ0i, δ1i) = (3,
1
2 ) and ci = 0.
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Panel 1: ECON ONLY
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Panel 2: ECON + PSYCH
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Figure 2.15: Predicted Week-3 Credit Card Spending (A Comparison Between ECON ONLY Case
and PSYCH+ECON Case)
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-3 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 3]), the x-axis depicts
weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors) correspond
to different values of weekly initial voucher stock (R). In the left panel (“ECON ONLY”
case), I set (δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) and ci = 0). In the right panel (“ECON+PSYCH” case), I set
(δ0i, δ1i) = (3,
1
2 ) and ci = 0.
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g Panel 2: Constant Satisfaction
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g Panel 3: Increasing Satisfaction
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g Panel 4: Decreasing Satisfaction
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Figure 2.16: Predicted Week-0 Credit Card Spending Given Different Coefficients of Satisfaction
Function (δ0i, δ1i) (An Example of PSYCH ONLY Case)
Note: The y-axis depicts Week-0 credit card spending (E[y|P,R,W = 0]), the x-axis depicts
weekly initial points stock (P ), and different curves (marked with different colors) correspond
to different values of weekly initial voucher stock (R). Across the four panels, I set
(δ0i, δ1i) = (0, 0) (no satisfaction), (δ0i, δ1i) = (3, 0) (constant marginal value of goals, i.e.,
constant satisfaction), (δ0i, δ1i) = (3, 12 ) (increasing marginal value of goals, i.e., increasing
satisfaction), (δ0i, δ1i) = (3,− 12 ) (decreasing marginal value of goals, i.e., decreasing
satisfaction).
97
method of estimation can accurately recover the model parameters.
Table 2.12: Simulation for parameter recovery.
Parameter True Value Estimate Std. Error 95% CI
Discount factor
β 0.80 0.83∗∗∗ (0.26) [0.32,1.34]
Opportunity Costs
φ1 −0.50 −0.51∗∗∗ (0.12) [−0.75,−0.27]
φ2 −2.50 −2.53∗∗∗ (0.38) [−3.27,−1.79]
φ3 −2.00 −2.05∗∗∗ (0.32) [−2.68,−1.42]
Psychological Mechanism
δ0 −0.75 −0.84∗∗∗ (0.23) [−1.29,−0.39]
δ1 1.00 1.13∗∗∗ (0.16) [0.82,1.44]
Economic Mechanism
ψ 5.00 4.65∗∗∗ (0.64) [3.40,5.90]
α 0.25 0.33∗∗∗ (0.13) [0.08,0.58]
c −5.00 −4.37∗∗∗ (0.70) [−5.74,−3.00]
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Here the 95% confidence interval (CI) is calculated as [µ̄−1.96σ̂, µ̄+1.96σ̂],
where µ̄ is the estimate of the parameter, and σ̂ is the standard error of the
estimate.
2.8.4 Appendix IV: Structural Estimation Results
Table 2.13 to 2.16 show the estimation results from the models that incorporate one type (the
homogeneous model) to four types (the Four-Latent-Class model).
2.8.5 Appendix V: The Validation of Counterfactual Analyses Using the
2009 Program Change
I leverage a massive program change on September 1st, 2009, to validate some of the results of my
counterfactual analyses. The program changes are fourfold: (1) the points issuance ratios for Store
1 (the non-network stores) doubled from 0.1 to 0.2; (2) the voucher conversion rule changed from
$15/500 points to $5/500 points; (3) the cap on the resulting discount rate from voucher redemption
increased from 30% to 100%;37 and (4) the frequency of voucher generation changed from four times
37Under the original 30% cap, one had to spend at least $50 to enjoy the full amount of the $15 discounts.
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Table 2.13: Estimates of the Homogeneous Model
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Parameter Estimate Std. Error
π1 1.0000 δ01 −0.1760 (0.3658)
β1 0.9833∗∗∗ (0.0027) δ11 0.9816∗∗∗ (0.0118)
φ11 −0.6140∗∗∗ (0.0154) ψ1 0.0068 (0.0051)
φ21 −2.6886∗∗∗ (0.0391) α1 2.9292∗∗∗ (0.2864)
φ31 −1.9865∗∗∗ (0.0776) c1 4.5146∗∗∗ (0.0763)
Obs. 50,552
Log-Likelihood −98, 661
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The parameter πs is the latent class probability of Type s. The param-
eters βs is the discount factor. The parameters φ1s, φ2s, φ3s are the coefficients
on the linear opportunity cost terms respectively concerning Store 1, 2, and 3.
The parameters δ0s, δ1s are the primitives of the psychological mechanism. The
parameter δ0s is the coefficient on the linear term, and δ1s is the coefficient on
the quadratic term. The parameters ψs, αs, cs are the primitives of the economic
mechanism. The parameters ψs, αs are the primitives of the benefit function of
the resulting discounts, and the parameter cs is the fixed redemption cost.
Table 2.14: Estimates of the Two-Latent-Class Model
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Type I π1 0.3742 δ01 0.4016 (0.4725)
β1 0.9258∗∗∗ (0.0297) δ11 0.6074∗∗∗ (0.0185)
φ11 −0.3766∗∗∗ (0.0199) ψ1 −1.4591 (14.6528)
φ21 −1.8030∗∗∗ (0.0501) α1 0.1548 (1.2934)
φ31 −1.3072∗∗∗ (0.1015) c1 4.2115∗∗∗ (0.2638)
Type II π2 0.6257∗∗∗ (0.0538) δ02 −0.0724 (1.6115)
β2 0.9761∗∗∗ (0.0340) δ12 1.2081∗∗∗ (0.0593)
φ12 −0.8234∗∗∗ (0.0719) ψ2 −1.5483 (172.4505)
φ22 −3.4320∗∗∗ (0.1799) α2 0.0760 (7.9037)
φ32 −2.6498∗∗∗ (0.3603) c2 5.0972∗∗∗ (0.5486)
Obs. 50,552
Log-Likelihood −94, 837
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The parameter πs is the latent class probability of Type s. The parameters βs is the
discount factor. The parameters φ1s, φ2s, φ3s are the coefficients on the linear opportunity cost
terms respectively concerning Store 1, 2, and 3. The parameters δ0s, δ1s are the primitives of
the psychological mechanism. The parameter δ0s is the coefficient on the linear term, and δ1s
is the coefficient on the quadratic term. The parameters ψs, αs, cs are the primitives of the
economic mechanism. The parameters ψs, αs are the primitives of the benefit function of the
resulting discounts, and the parameter cs is the fixed redemption cost.
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Table 2.15: Estimates of the Three-Latent-Class Model
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Type I π1 0.3205 δ01 0.3235 (0.5491)
β1 0.9135∗∗∗ (0.0421) δ11 0.6566∗∗∗ (0.0241)
φ11 −0.3546∗∗∗ (0.0227) ψ1 −3.8028 (35.2271)
φ21 −1.7175∗∗∗ (0.0574) α1 0.1036 (0.8455)
φ31 −1.3825∗∗∗ (0.1153) c1 4.1752∗∗∗ (0.2903)
Type II π2 0.5489∗∗∗ (0.0474) δ02 0.3384 (3.0928)
β2 0.9793∗∗∗ (0.0442) δ12 1.1262∗∗∗ (0.0813)
φ12 −0.7522∗∗∗ (0.1327) ψ2 0.4410 (3.2108)
φ22 −3.4051∗∗∗ (0.3333) α2 −0.7437 (12.7330)
φ32 −3.2840∗∗∗ (0.6648) c2 5.3496∗∗∗ (1.5312)
Type III π3 0.1304∗∗∗ (0.0178) δ03 −0.7784∗∗∗ (0.3057)
β3 0.9563∗∗∗ (0.0299) δ13 0.7793∗∗∗ (0.0251)
φ13 −1.4714∗∗∗ (0.0169) ψ3 −13.4839 (76.7460)
φ23 −3.4386∗∗∗ (0.0526) α3 −0.1313 (0.8348)
φ33 −1.4519∗∗∗ (0.0837) c3 5.1644∗∗∗ (0.7768)
Obs. 50,552
Log-Likelihood −92,985
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The parameter πs is the latent class probability of Type s. The parameters βs is the
discount factor. The parameters φ1s, φ2s, φ3s are the coefficients on the linear opportunity cost
terms respectively concerning Store 1, 2, and 3. The parameters δ0s, δ1s are the primitives of
the psychological mechanism. The parameter δ0s is the coefficient on the linear term, and δ1s
is the coefficient on the quadratic term. The parameters ψs, αs, cs are the primitives of the
economic mechanism. The parameters ψs, αs are the primitives of the benefit function of the
resulting discounts, and the parameter cs is the fixed redemption cost.
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Table 2.16: Estimates of the Four-Latent-Class Model
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Type I π1 0.2900 δ01 0.1778 (0.4817)
β1 0.9159∗∗∗ (0.0425) δ11 0.6211∗∗∗ (0.0235)
φ11 −0.3356∗∗∗ (0.0203) ψ1 −2.5226 (15.4955)
φ21 −1.7457∗∗∗ (0.0517) α1 0.1553 (0.7928)
φ31 −1.2934∗∗∗ (0.1037) c1 4.0920∗∗∗ (0.2821)
Type II π2 0.1938∗∗∗ (0.0206) δ02 −1.1614 (0.4899)
β2 0.9712∗∗∗ (0.0622) δ12 1.0021∗∗∗ (0.0510)
φ12 −1.1872∗∗∗ (0.0177) ψ2 −3.6650 (145.2980)
φ22 −3.7847∗∗∗ (0.0617) α2 −0.1371 (5.9256)
φ32 −1.8746∗∗∗ (0.0875) c2 4.7562∗∗∗ (1.0543)
Type III π3 0.0237∗∗∗ (0.0111) δ03 1.9769∗∗∗ (1.5525)
β3 0.8856∗∗∗ (0.0684) δ13 0.3891∗∗∗ (0.0891)
φ13 −4.2952∗∗∗ (0.4665) ψ3 −11.7495 (120.7520)
φ23 −1.6939∗∗∗ (0.1684) α3 −0.1622 (2.1056)
φ33 −1.3233∗∗∗ (0.3424) c3 4.9113∗∗∗ (3.0266)
Type IV π4 0.4924∗∗∗ (0.0431) δ04 0.9171∗∗∗ (3.9353)
β4 0.9791∗∗∗ (0.0437) δ14 1.0005∗∗∗ (0.0889)
φ14 −0.7143∗∗∗ (0.1649) ψ4 −3.3255 (308.9483)
φ24 −3.2991∗∗∗ (0.4140) α4 0.0629 (5.4465)
φ34 −3.5063∗∗∗ (0.8256) c4 5.4733∗∗∗ (0.7860)
Obs. 50,552
Log-Likelihood −92,448
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The parameter πs is the latent class probability of Type s. The parameters βs is the
discount factor. The parameters φ1s, φ2s, φ3s are the coefficients on the linear opportunity cost
terms respectively concerning Store 1, 2, and 3. The parameters δ0s, δ1s are the primitives of
the psychological mechanism. The parameter δ0s is the coefficient on the linear term, and δ1s
is the coefficient on the quadratic term. The parameters ψs, αs, cs are the primitives of the
economic mechanism. The parameters ψs, αs are the primitives of the benefit function of the
resulting discounts, and the parameter cs is the fixed redemption cost.
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per year into monthly. Also, vouchers with face values $15 earned before the program change obey
the caps after the program change. The changes (1) and (2) are what I leverage to validate my
counterfactual analyses. I analyze credit card spending before and after the program change. Using
a sample of 857 consumers who opened an account since 2007, and who experienced the program
change, I estimate the following Random-Effects Tobit model:
Yijt =

Y ∗ijt if Y ∗ijt ≥ 0
0 if Y ∗ijt < 0,
j = 1, 2, 3,
where
Y ∗ijt = β1postit + λi + εit
Here the variable Yijt denotes credit card spending of consumer i in in Store j in week t. Here
j = 1, 2, 3 refer to the non-network stores, the network stores, and the total spending. The variable
Y ∗ijt is the latent value for Yijt, the variable postit indicates whether the current period is after the
program change. Table 2.17 presents the estimation results.
Table 2.17 shows that (1) consumers increased spending in non-network stores; (2) decreased
spending in the network stores; and (3) increased total spending using the credit card. This validates
what my counterfactual analysis shows: increasing points issuance ratios is the way to leverage the
effective psychological mechanism to stimulate credit card spending to increase profits.
Table 2.17: The Impact of the 2009 Program Change on Credit Card Spending
Non-Network Stores Network Stores Total
After Change 50.6730∗∗∗ −158.5899∗∗∗ 12.6695∗
(5.5565) (9.1139) (5.4368)
Obs. 147,448 147,448 147,448
Note: (1) standard errors in parentheses; (2) ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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